Threat engagement and deception escalation

ABSTRACT

Provided are methods, network devices, and computer-program products for a network deception system. The network deception system can engage a network threat with a deception mechanism, and dynamically escalating the deception to maintain the engagement. The system can include super-low, low, and high-interaction deceptions. The super-low deceptions can respond to requests for address information, and requires few computing resources. When network traffic directed to the super-low deception requires a more complex response, the system can initiate a low-interaction deception. The low-interaction deception can emulate multiple devices, which can give the low-interaction deception away as a deception. Hence, when the network traffic includes an attempted connection, the system can initiate a high-interaction deception. The high-interaction more closely emulates a network device, and can be more difficult to identify as a deception. The high-interaction deception can fully engage a network threat, and can be initiated only as needed.

CROSS REFERENCES TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims the benefit of and priority to U.S. ProvisionalApplication No. 62/327,829, filed on Apr. 26, 2016; U.S. ProvisionalApplication No. 62/344,267, filed on Jun. 1, 2016; and IndianProvisional Application No. 201741008619, filed on Mar. 13, 2017. Eachof the preceding applications are incorporated herein by reference intheir entirety.

BRIEF SUMMARY

Provided are methods, including computer-implemented methods or methodsimplemented by a network device, devices including network devices, andcomputer-program products for network threat engagement and deceptionescalation. In various implementations, super-low deception mechanismscan be implemented that require few computation resources, and that canrespond to basic network packets for specific Internet Protocol (IP)addresses. When a suspected network threat attempts to engage with asuper-low deception, the deception can be escalated to an interactivedeception, include a low-interaction deception or a high-interactiondeception. Interactive deceptions can better emulate a real computingsystem in a network. In various implementations, the interactivedeception is configured in response to network traffic from the networkthreat, so that the network threat may be presented with a system and/ordata that may meet the threat's desired intent. In this way, it may bepossible to keep the threat engaged, and to gain intelligence about thethreat.

In various implementations, a network device can be configured with asuper-low deception mechanism. The super-low deception mechanism caninclude address information, where the address information includes aMedia Access Control (MAC) address and an Internet Protocol (IP)address. The network device can further be configured to receive networktraffic addressed to the MAC address or the IP address. The networkdevice can further be configured to determine that the network trafficis suspect. The network device can further be configured to initiate aninteractive deception mechanism, which includes de-assigning the addressinformation from the address deception mechanism and reassigning theaddress information to the interactive deception mechanism. The networkdevice can further be configured to direct the network traffic to theinteractive deception mechanism.

In various implementations, the network device can further be configuredto receive a request addressed to the address deception mechanism, andrespond to the request using the address information.

In various implementations, determining that network traffic is suspectincludes analyzing a behavior of the network traffic, and determiningthat a behavior of particular network traffic corresponds to behaviorassociated with a network attack.

In various implementations, the interactive deception mechanism is alow-interaction deception mechanism, where a low-interaction deceptionmechanism is configured to respond to one or more network addresses. Insome implementations, when the interactive deception mechanism is alow-interaction deception mechanism, the network device a be furtherconfigured to monitor the network traffic to the low-interactiondeception mechanism, and determine that particular network traffic issuspect.

In various implementations, the network device can be further configuredto initiating a high-interaction deception mechanism. Initiating thenetwork device can include de-assigning the address information from thelow-interaction deception mechanism and reassigning the addressinformation to the high-interaction deception mechanism. The networkdevice can further be configured to direct the particular networktraffic to the high-interaction deception mechanism.

In various implementations, the interactive deception mechanism is ahigh-interaction deception mechanism, where a high-interaction deceptionmechanism is configured with a particular operating system andparticular services.

In some implementations, the interactive deception mechanism isexecuting on the network device. In some implementations, theinteractive deception mechanism is executing on another network device.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Illustrative embodiments are described in detail below with reference tothe following figures:

FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a network threat detection and analysissystem, in which various implementations of a deception-based securitysystem can be used;

FIGS. 2A-2D provide examples of different installation configurationsthat can be used for different customer networks;

FIG. 3A-3B illustrate examples of customer networks where some of thecustomer networks' network infrastructure is “in the cloud,” that is, isprovided by a cloud services provider;

FIG. 4 illustrates an example of an enterprise network;

FIG. 5 illustrates a general example of an Internet-of-Things network;

FIG. 6 illustrates an example of an Internet-of-Things network, hereimplemented in a private home;

FIG. 7 illustrates an Internet-of-Things network, here implemented in asmall business;

FIG. 8 illustrates an example of the basic operation of an industrialcontrol system;

FIG. 9 illustrates an example of a SCADA system, here used fordistributed monitoring and control;

FIG. 10 illustrates an example of a distributed control;

FIG. 11 illustrates an example of a PLC implemented in a manufacturingcontrol process;

FIG. 12 illustrates an example of a network deception system;

FIGS. 13A-13C illustrate an example of keeping a possible attackerengaged through escalation of the deceptions and reassignment of MAC andIP addresses;

FIG. 14 illustrates several examples of information about networktraffic that can be used to identify particular network traffic asquestionable;

FIGS. 15A-15B illustrate examples of deception escalation when a sendermakes various types of connection attempts;

FIG. 16 illustrates an example of a network deception system escalatingan engagement from a super-low deception directly to a high-interactiondeception; and

FIGS. 17A-17D illustrate an example of a deception mechanism that can beconfigured in response to a particular network packet or series ofpackets.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Network deception mechanisms, often referred to as “honeypots,” “honeytokens,” and “honey nets,” among others, defend a network from threatsby distracting or diverting the threat. Honeypot-type deceptionmechanisms can be installed in a network for a particular site, such asa business office, to act as decoys in the site's network. Honeypot-typedeception mechanisms are typically configured to be indistinguishablefrom active, production systems in the network. Additionally, suchdeception mechanisms are typically configured to be attractive to anetwork threat by having seemingly valuable data and/or by appearingvulnerable to infiltration. Though these deception mechanisms can beindistinguishable from legitimate parts of the site network, deceptionmechanisms are not part of the normal operation of the network, andwould not be accessed during normal, legitimate use of the site network.Because normal users of the site network would not normally use oraccess a deception mechanism, any use or access to the deceptionmechanism is suspected to be a threat to the network.

“Normal” operation of a network generally includes network activity thatconforms with the intended purpose of a network. For example, normal orlegitimate network activity can include the operation of a business,medical facility, government office, education institution, or theordinary network activity of a private home. Normal network activity canalso include the non-business-related, casual activity of users of anetwork, such as accessing personal email and visiting websites onpersonal time, or using network resources for personal use. Normalactivity can also include the operations of network security devices,such as firewalls, anti-virus tools, intrusion detection systems,intrusion protection systems, email filters, adware blockers, and so on.Normal operations, however, exclude deceptions mechanisms, in thatdeception mechanisms are not intended to take part in businessoperations or casual use. As such, network users and network systems donot normally access deceptions mechanisms except perhaps for the mostroutine network administrative tasks. Access to a deception mechanism,other than entirely routine network administration, may thus indicate athreat to the network.

Threats to a network can include active attacks, where an attackerinteracts or engages with systems in the network to steal information ordo harm to the network. An attacker may be a person, or may be anautomated system. Examples of active attacks include denial of service(DoS) attacks, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, spoofingattacks, “man-in-the-middle” attacks, attacks involving malformednetwork requests (e.g. Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning,“ping of death,” etc.), buffer, heap, or stack overflow attacks, andformat string attacks, among others. Threats to a network can alsoinclude self-driven, self-replicating, and/or self-triggering malicioussoftware. Malicious software can appear innocuous until activated, uponwhich the malicious software may attempt to steal information from anetwork and/or do harm to the network. Malicious software is typicallydesigned to spread itself to other systems in a network. Examples ofmalicious software include ransomware, viruses, worms, Trojan horses,spyware, keyloggers, rootkits, and rogue security software, amongothers.

In at least some cases, honeypot-type deception mechanisms can be easilyidentified as decoys. For example, a deception mechanism can befingerprinted and identified as a decoy by examining how it responds tonetwork packets. Specifically, a decoy system may be executing a Linuxoperating system, and present a Windows operating system to the network.

The decoy system's pattern of responses to network packets, however, maygive it away as a Linux-based system. As another example, a deceptionmechanism implemented using a proxy server may present multiple InternetProtocol (IP) addresses to the network, where each IP address is meantto represent a distinct decoy system. Because the proxy server typicallyhas only one Media Access Control (MAC) address, however, once anattacker accesses any of the multiple IP addresses, the attacker mayknow that he has found a decoy system on the network.

More authentic-seeming deception mechanisms can be created using virtualmachines. A virtual machine is an emulated computer system running onthe hardware of a physical computer system. A virtual machine typicallyexecutes its own operating system, which may be different than theoperating system running on the underlying physical computer system. Thevirtual machine can also provide user applications, which have accessonly to the resources provided by the virtual machine. The virtualmachine can make some or all of the resources of the physical computersystem available to its virtual operating system and applications.Alternatively or additionally, the virtual machine can present emulatedphysical resources to its operating system or applications. The physicalcomputer system may be able to host multiple virtual machines, with thevirtual machines sharing the physical computer system's hardwareresources.

A deception mechanism implemented using a virtual machine may be able tohave distinct MAC address, in addition to having a distinct IP address.Multiple virtual machines can thus be used to create multiple deceptionmechanisms, which may appear indistinct from real systems on thenetwork. Virtual machines, however, require processing resources. Thephysical machine that is hosting the virtual machines typically can onlysupport a limited number of virtual machines. Thus the number of virtualmachine-based deception mechanisms that can be placed on a network maybe limited by available physical computing resources.

Virtual machine-based deception mechanisms may also be able to engage anetwork attacker. The virtual machine can be configured with authenticservices and/or data that appear to be valuable. By keeping an attackerengaged, the attacker is kept away from the real systems in the network.Additionally, by allowing the attacker to freely access the virtualmachine, information can be collected about the attacker, including, forexample, his intentions, his methods of attack, his network location,and/or is identity.

Simpler and less processor-intensive deception mechanisms, however, maybe able to engage an attacker only for a short time. Lessprocessor-intensive deception mechanisms, such as proxy servers, networkaddress table (NAT)-based deceptions, and servers emulating services,may attract the attention of an attacker, but once the attacker beginsto explore these deceptions, the attacker may quickly learn that theyare decoys. For example, once an attacker has gained shell access to oneof the deceptions, by exploring the environment provided by thedeception the deception's true nature may be revealed. Additionally,less processor-intensive deceptions may not be able to engage anattacker to the same degree that a real network host can.

Additionally knowing which services and/or data to configure for adeception mechanism can be difficult. Network threats are frequentlytargeted at a specific type of network system, certain data, and/or areseeking to exploit particular vulnerability. If the threat actor'sintent were known it would be possible to put up defenses to the actor'sattack. Conversely, it would be possible to tailor a deception mechanismthat is a perfect trap for the threat actor.

Generally, however, a threat actor's exact goal, and the method by whichthe actor will attempt such a goal, cannot be known in advance. Theconfiguration of a deception mechanism may thus only be a best guess atservices and/or data that are desirable attack targets. Theconfiguration can be based on threat intelligence, but even the bestthreat intelligence may not be able to anticipate so called “zero-day”attacks, which are attacks that take advantage of previously unknownvulnerabilities.

In various implementations, a network deception system can beimplemented that dynamically escalates an engagement with a threatsource. The network deception system can also dynamically configuredeception mechanisms in response to network packets received from aperceived threat source. In this way, the threat source may have a muchtougher time distinguishing real assets in the network from deceptions,and can be kept engaged and away from real assets in a network.Additionally, intelligence can be gathered about the threat source.

In various implementations, the network deception system can include anemulated network. The emulated network can include one or more verylow-interaction, network address-based deception mechanisms, as well aslow-interaction deception mechanisms and high-interaction deceptionmechanisms. The network address-based deceptions and the low-interactiondeceptions can operate to attract and engage the attention of a networkthreat. The high-interaction deception can then keep the attackerengaged and contained.

In various implementations, the super-low deceptions may not require avirtual machine, and thus may require few processing resources. Thelow-interaction deceptions can use a virtual machine, where the virtualmachine is able to represent many emulated network devices. The networkdeception system can initiate a low-interaction deception when networktraffic is received that appears suspicious. Should the networkdeception system receive additional network traffic that requires a moreinvolved engagement, the network deception system can initiate ahigh-interaction deception. Communications to the low-interactiondeception can thereafter be redirected to the high-interactiondeception. The high-interaction deception can also be a virtual machine,here dedicated to convincingly emulating one system.

Low-interaction and high-interaction deceptions thus can be initiatedonly as needed. Super-low deceptions may require very little processingresources. By using more processor-intensive deceptions only as needed,the network deception system can possibly emulate thousands ofdeceptions on a network, and save processing resources for instanceswhere an attack on the network is suspected.

Additionally, in various implementations, the deception mechanisms canbe assigned distinct and authentic-seeming MAC addresses, as well aslegitimate IP addresses. When a low-interaction deception is initiated,in response to suspect network traffic, a MAC address and its associatedIP address can be de-assigned from a super-low deception and can bereassigned to the low-interaction deception. Similarly, when ahigh-interaction deception is initiated, the MAC address and IP addressmay be de-assigned from the low-interaction deception and be reassignedto the high-interaction deception. In this way, threat source may beseamlessly transferred between deceptions, keeping the threat sourceengaged and fooled.

In various implementations, the network deception system can alsodynamically reconfigure the emulated network, to keep an attackerengaged and contained. For example, once an apparent attacker is engagedwith a high-interaction deception, the network deception system mayinitiate additional deceptions. Some of these additional deceptions maybe configured to resemble systems on the real network. Thus, should thethreat source attempt to move laterally from the high-interactiondeception to another network system, the threat source can be connectedto another deception, even if the threat source attempts to connect to areal system on the real network. In this way, the attacker may remainengaged, and may be kept out of the real network.

In various implementations, the deception mechanisms can be dynamicallyconfigured, and tailored to an apparent intent of a threat source. Theultimate goal of the threat source may not be determinable in advance,but by automatically and dynamically responding to various types ofinput that a threat source can send to a deception mechanism, thenetwork deception system can attempt to give the threat source what itis that the threat source is looking for. For example, when thedeception mechanism receives packets that use a particular networkprotocol, the deception mechanism can be mutated or morphed to have theparticular protocol (e.g., the appropriate service is launched to enablethe protocol). As another example, when the deception mechanism receivespackets with data that seek to exploit a bug in a particularapplication, the deception mechanism can be morphed into having theapplication, with the bug (e.g., a copy of the application isautomatically placed on the deception mechanism). In these and otherexamples, dynamic, context-aware deceptions can be generated that areresponsive to a particular threat.

Keeping the threat source engaged can have the benefit of keeping thethreat source away from actual network systems and truly valuable data.Additionally, the deception mechanism can be used to gather intelligenceabout the threat source. For example, it may be possible to determinethe threat source's methods, such as tools the threat source is using.As another example, the threat source's activity may reveal a previouslyunknown software, firmware, and/or hardware vulnerability. As anotherexample, it may be possible to identify types of targets that maliciousactors are presently after. As another example, it may be possible totrace a threat source and find its origin.

I. Deception-Based Security Systems

FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a network threat detection and analysissystem 100, in which various implementations of a deception-basedsecurity system can be used. The network threat detection and analysissystem 100, or, more briefly, network security system 100, providessecurity for a site network 104 using deceptive security mechanisms, avariety of which may be called “honeypots.” The deceptive securitymechanisms may be controlled by and inserted into the site network 104using a deception center 108 and sensors 110, which may also be referredto as deception sensors, installed in the site network 104. In someimplementations, the deception center 108 and the sensors 110 interactwith a security services provider 106 located outside of the sitenetwork 104. The deception center 108 may also obtain or exchange datawith sources located on the Internet 150.

Security mechanisms designed to deceive, sometimes referred to as“honeypots,” may also be used as traps to divert and/or deflectunauthorized use of a network away from the real network assets. Adeception-based security mechanism may be a computer attached to thenetwork, a process running on one or more network systems, and/or someother device connected to the network. A security mechanism may beconfigured to offer services, real or emulated, to serve as bait for anattack on the network. Deception-based security mechanisms that take theform of data, which may be called “honey tokens,” may be mixed in withreal data in devices in the network. Alternatively or additionally,emulated data may also be provided by emulated systems or services.

Deceptive security mechanisms can also be used to detect an attack onthe network. Deceptive security mechanisms are generally configured toappear as if they are legitimate parts of a network. These securitymechanisms, however, are not, in fact, part of the normal operation ofthe network. Consequently, normal activity on the network is not likelyto access the security mechanisms. Thus any access over the network tothe security mechanism is automatically suspect.

The network security system 100 may deploy deceptive security mechanismsin a targeted and dynamic fashion. Using the deception center 108 thesystem 100 can scan the site network 104 and determine the topology ofthe site network 104. The deception center 108 may then determinedevices to emulate with security mechanisms, including the type andbehavior of the device. The security mechanisms may be selected andconfigured specifically to attract the attention of network attackers.The security mechanisms may also be selected and deployed based onsuspicious activity in the network. Security mechanisms may be deployed,removed, modified, or replaced in response to activity in the network,to divert and isolate network activity related to an apparent attack,and to confirm that the network activity is, in fact, part of a realattack.

The site network 104 is a network that may be installed among thebuildings of a large business, in the office of a small business, at aschool campus, at a hospital, at a government facility, or in a privatehome. The site network 104 may be described as a local area network(LAN) or a group of LANs. The site network 104 may be one site belongingto an organization that has multiple site networks 104 in one or manygeographical locations. In some implementations, the deception center108 may provide network security to one site network 104, or to multiplesite networks 104 belonging to the same entity.

The site network 104 is where the networking devices and users of the anorganizations network may be found. The site network 104 may includenetwork infrastructure devices, such as routers, switches hubs,repeaters, wireless base stations, and/or network controllers, amongothers. The site network 104 may also include computing systems, such asservers, desktop computers, laptop computers, tablet computers, personaldigital assistants, and smart phones, among others. The site network 104may also include other analog and digital electronics that have networkinterfaces, such as televisions, entertainment systems, thermostats,refrigerators, and so on.

The deception center 108 provides network security for the site network104 (or multiple site networks for the same organization) by deployingsecurity mechanisms into the site network 104, monitoring the sitenetwork 104 through the security mechanisms, detecting and redirectingapparent threats, and analyzing network activity resulting from theapparent threat. To provide security for the site network 104, invarious implementations the deception center 108 may communicate withsensors 110 installed in the site network 104, using network tunnels120. As described further below, the tunnels 120 may allow the deceptioncenter 108 to be located in a different sub-network (“subnet”) than thesite network 104, on a different network, or remote from the sitenetwork 104, with intermediate networks (possibly including the Internet150) between the deception center 108 and the site network 104.

In some implementations, the network security system 100 includes asecurity services provider 106. In these implementations, the securityservices provider 106 may act as a central hub for providing security tomultiple site networks, possibly including site networks controlled bydifferent organizations. For example, the security services provider 106may communicate with multiple deception centers 108 that each providesecurity for a different site network 104 for the same organization. Insome implementations, the security services provider 106 is locatedoutside the site network 104. In some implementations, the securityservices provider 106 is controlled by a different entity than theentity that controls the site network. For example, the securityservices provider 106 may be an outside vendor. In some implementations,the security services provider 106 is controlled by the same entity asthat controls the site network 104.

In some implementations, when the network security system 100 includes asecurity services provider 106, the sensors 110 and the deception center108 may communicate with the security services provider 106 in order tobe connected to each other. For example, the sensors 110, which may alsobe referred to as deception sensors, may, upon powering on in the sitenetwork 104, send information over a network connection 112 to thesecurity services provider 106, identifying themselves and the sitenetwork 104 in which they are located. The security services provider106 may further identify a corresponding deception center 108 for thesite network 104. The security services provider 106 may then providethe network location of the deception center 108 to the sensors 110, andmay provide the deception center 108 with the network location of thesensors 110. A network location may take the form of, for example, anInternet Protocol (IP) address. With this information, the deceptioncenter 108 and the sensors 110 may be able to configure tunnels 120 tocommunicate with each other.

In some implementations, the network security system 100 does notinclude a security services provider 106. In these implementations, thesensors 110 and the deception center 108 may be configured to locateeach other by, for example, sending packets that each can recognize ascoming for the other. Using these packets, the sensors 110 and deceptioncenter 108 may be able to learn their respective locations on thenetwork. Alternatively or additionally, a network administrator canconfigure the sensors 110 with the network location of the deceptioncenter 108, and vice versa.

In various implementations, the sensors 110 are a minimal combination ofhardware and/or software, sufficient to form a network connection withthe site network 104 and a tunnel 120 with the deception center 108. Forexample, a sensor 110 may be constructed using a low-power processor, anetwork interface, and a simple operating system. In variousimplementations, the sensors 110 provide the deception center 108 withvisibility into the site network 104, such as for example being able tooperate as a node in the site network 104, and/or being able to presentor project deceptive security mechanisms into the site network 104, asdescribed further below. Additionally, in various implementations, thesensors 110 may provide a portal through which a suspected attack on thesite network 104 can be redirected to the deception center 108, as isalso described below.

In various implementations, the deception center 108 may be configuredto profile the site network 104, deploy deceptive security mechanismsfor the site network 104, detect suspected threats to the site network104, analyze the suspected threat, and analyze the site network 104 forexposure and/or vulnerability to the supposed threat.

To provide the site network 104, the deception center 108 may include adeception profiler 130. In various implementations, the deceptionprofiler may 130 derive information 114 from the site network 104, anddetermine, for example, the topology of the site network 104, thenetwork devices included in the site network 104, the software and/orhardware configuration of each network device, and/or how the network isused at any given time. Using this information, the deception profiler130 may determine one or more deceptive security mechanisms to deployinto the site network 104.

In various implementations, the deception profiler may configure anemulated network 116 to emulate one or more computing systems. Using thetunnels 120 and sensors 110, the emulated computing systems may beprojected into the site network 104, where they serve as deceptions. Theemulated computing systems may include address deceptions,low-interaction deceptions, and/or high-interaction deceptions. In someimplementations, the emulated computing systems may be configured toresemble a portion of the network. In these implementations, thisnetwork portion may then be projected into the site network 104.

In various implementations, a network threat detection engine 140 maymonitor activity in the emulated network 116, and look for attacks onthe site network 104. For example, the network threat detection engine140 may look for unexpected access to the emulated computing systems inthe emulated network 116. The network threat detection engine 140 mayalso use information 114 extracted from the site network 104 to adjustthe emulated network 116, in order to make the deceptions moreattractive to an attack, and/or in response to network activity thatappears to be an attack. Should the network threat detection engine 140determine that an attack may be taking place, the network threatdetection engine 140 may cause network activity related to the attack tobe redirected to and contained within the emulated network 116.

In various implementations, the emulated network 116 is aself-contained, isolated, and closely monitored network, in whichsuspect network activity may be allowed to freely interact with emulatedcomputing systems. In various implementations, questionable emails,files, and/or links may be released into the emulated network 116 toconfirm that they are malicious, and/or to see what effect they have.Outside actors can also be allowed to access emulated system, steal dataand user credentials, download malware, and conduct any other maliciousactivity. In this way, the emulated network 116 not only isolated asuspected attack from the site network 104, but can also be used tocapture information about an attack. Any activity caused by suspectnetwork activity may be captured in, for example, a history of sent andreceived network packets, log files, and memory snapshots.

In various implementations, activity captured in the emulated network116 may be analyzed using a targeted threat analysis engine 160. Thethreat analysis engine 160 may examine data collected in the emulatednetwork 116 and reconstruct the course of an attack. For example, thethreat analysis engine 160 may correlate various events seen during thecourse of an apparent attack, including both malicious and innocuousevents, and determine how an attacker infiltrated and caused harm in theemulated network 116. In some cases, the threat analysis engine 160 mayuse threat intelligence 152 from the Internet 150 to identify and/oranalyze an attack contained in the emulated network 116. The threatanalysis engine 160 may also confirm that suspect network activity wasnot an attack. The threat analysis engine 160 may produce indicators 162that describe the suspect network activity, including indicating whetherthe suspect activity was or was not an actual threat. The threatanalysis engine 160 may share these indicators 162 with the securitycommunity 180, so that other networks can be defended from the attack.The threat analysis engine 160 may also send the indicators 162 to thesecurity services provider 106, so that the security services provider106 can use the indicators to defend other site networks.

In various implementations, the threat analysis engine 160 may also sendthreat indicators 162, or similar data, to a behavioral analytics engine170. The behavioral analytics engine 170 may be configured to use theindicators 162 to probe 118 the site network 104, and see whether thesite network 104 has been exposed to the attack, or is vulnerable to theattack. For example, the behavioral analytics engine 170 may search thesite network 104 for computing systems that resemble emulated computingsystems in the emulated network 116 that were affected by the attack. Insome implementations, the behavioral analytics engine 170 can alsorepair systems affected by the attack, or identify these systems to anetwork administrator. In some implementations, the behavioral analyticsengine 170 can also reconfigure the site network's 104 securityinfrastructure to defend against the attack.

The behavioral analytics engine 170 can work in conjunction with aSecurity Information and Event Management (SIEM) 172 system. In variousimplementations, SIEM includes software and/or services that can providereal-time analysis of security alerts generates by network hardware andapplications. In various implementations, the deception center 108 cancommunicate with the SIEM 172 system to obtain information aboutcomputing and/or networking systems in the site network 104.

Using deceptive security mechanisms, the network security system 100 maythus be able to distract and divert attacks on the site network 104. Thenetwork security system 100 may also be able to allow, using theemulated network 116, and attack to proceed, so that as much can belearned about the attack as possible. Information about the attack canthen be used to find vulnerabilities in the site network 104.Information about the attack can also be provided to the securitycommunity 180, so that the attack can be thwarted elsewhere.

II. Customer Installations

The network security system, such as the deception-based systemdescribed above, may be flexibly implemented to accommodate differentcustomer networks. FIGS. 2A-2D provide examples of differentinstallation configurations 200 a-200 d that can be used for differentcustomer networks 202. A customer network 202 may generally be describedas a network or group of networks that is controlled by a common entity,such as a business, a school, or a person. The customer network 202 mayinclude one or more site networks 204. The customer network's 202 sitenetworks 204 may be located in one geographic location, may be behind acommon firewall, and/or may be multiple subnets within one network.Alternatively or additionally, a customer network's 202 site networks204 may be located in different geographic locations, and be connectedto each other over various private and public networks, including theInternet 250.

Different customer networks 202 may have different requirementsregarding network security. For example, some customer networks 202 mayhave relatively open connections to outside networks such as theInternet 250, while other customer networks 202 have very restrictedaccess to outside networks. The network security system described inFIG. 1 may be configurable to accommodate these variations.

FIG. 2A illustrates one example of an installation configuration 200 a,where a deception center 208 is located within the customer network 202.In this example, being located within the customer network 202 meansthat the deception center 208 is connected to the customer network 202,and is able to function as a node in the customer network 202. In thisexample, the deception center 208 may be located in the same building orwithin the same campus as the site network 204. Alternatively oradditionally, the deception center 208 may be located within thecustomer network 202 but at a different geographic location than thesite network 204. The deception center 208 thus may be within the samesubnet as the site network 204, or may be connected to a differentsubnet within the customer network.

In various implementations, the deception center 208 communicates withsensors 210, which may also be referred to as deception sensors,installed in the site network over network tunnels 220 In this example,the network tunnels 220 may cross one or more intermediate within thecustomer network 202.

In this example, the deception center 208 is able to communicate with asecurity services provider 206 that is located outside the customernetwork 202, such as on the Internet 250. The security services provider206 may provide configuration and other information for the deceptioncenter 208. In some cases, the security services provider 206 may alsoassist in coordinating the security for the customer network 202 whenthe customer network 202 includes multiple site networks 204 located invarious geographic areas.

FIG. 2B illustrates another example of an installation configuration 200b, where the deception center 208 is located outside the customernetwork 202. In this example, the deception center 208 may connected tothe customer network 202 over the Internet 250. In some implementations,the deception center 208 may be co-located with a security servicesprovider, and/or may be provided by the security services provider.

In this example, the tunnels 220 connect the deception center 208 to thesensors 210 through a gateway 262. A gateway is a point in a networkthat connects the network to another network. For example, in thisexample, the gateway 262 connects the customer network 202 to outsidenetworks, such as the Internet 250. The gateway 262 may provide afirewall, which may provide some security for the customer network 202.The tunnels 220 may be able to pass through the firewall using a secureprotocol, such as Secure Socket Shell (SSH) and similar protocols.Secure protocols typically require credentials, which may be provided bythe operator of the customer network 202.

FIG. 2C illustrates another example of an installation configuration 200c, where the deception center 208 is located inside the customer network202 but does not have access to outside networks. In someimplementations, the customer network 202 may require a high level ofnetwork security. In these implementations, the customer network's 202connections to the other networks may be very restricted. Thus, in thisexample, the deception center 208 is located within the customer network202, and does not need to communicate with outside networks. Thedeception center 208 may use the customer networks 202 internal networkto coordinate with and establish tunnels 220 to the sensors 210.Alternatively or additionally, a network administrator may configure thedeception center 208 and sensors 210 to enable them to establish thetunnels 220.

FIG. 2D illustrates another example of an installation configuration 200d. In this example, the deception center 208 is located inside thecustomer network 202, and further is directly connected to the sitenetwork 204. Directly connected, in this example, can mean that thedeception center 208 is connected to a router, hub, switch, repeater, orother network infrastructure device that is part of the site network204. Directly connected can alternatively or additionally mean that thedeception center 208 is connected to the site network 204 using aVirtual Local Area Network (VLAN). For example, the deception center 208can be connected to VLAN trunk port. In these examples, the deceptioncenter 208 can project deceptions into the site network 204 with orwithout the use of sensors, such as are illustrated in FIGS. 2A-2C.

In the example of FIG. 2D, the deception center 208 can also optionallybe connected to an outside security services provider 206. The securityservices provider 206 can manage the deception center 208, includingproviding updated security data, sending firmware upgrades, and/orcoordinating different deception centers 208 for different site networks204 belonging to the same customer network 202. In some implementations,the deception center 208 can operate without the assistances of anoutside security services provider 206.

III. Customer Networks

The network security system, such as the deception-based systemdiscussed above, can be used for variety of customer networks. As notedabove, customer networks can come in wide variety of configurations. Forexample, a customer network may have some of its network infrastructure“in the cloud.” A customer network can also include a wide variety ofdevices, including what may be considered “traditional” networkequipment, such as servers and routers, and non-traditional,“Internet-of-Things” devices, such as kitchen appliances. Other examplesof customer networks include established industrial networks, or a mixof industrial networks and computer networks.

FIG. 3A-3B illustrate examples of customer networks 302 a-302 b wheresome of the customer networks' 302 a-302 b network infrastructure is “inthe cloud,” that is, is provided by a cloud services provider 354. Theseexample customer networks 302 a-302 b may be defended by a networksecurity system that includes a deception center 308 and sensors 310,which may also be referred to as deception sensors, and may also includean off-site security services provider 306.

A cloud services provider is a company that offers some component ofcloud computer—such as Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Software as aService (SaaS) or Platform as Service (PaaS)—to other businesses andindividuals. A cloud services provider may have a configurable pool ofcomputing resources, including, for example, networks, servers, storage,applications, and services. These computing resources can be availableon demand, and can be rapidly provisioned. While a cloud servicesprovider's resources may be shared between the cloud service provider'scustomers, from the perspective of each customer, the individualcustomer may appear to have a private network within the cloud,including for example having dedicated subnets and IP addresses.

In the examples illustrated in FIGS. 3A-3B, the customer networks' 302a-302 b network is partially in a site network 304, and partiallyprovided by the cloud services provider 354. In some cases, the sitenetwork 304 is the part of the customer networks 302 a-302 b that islocated at a physical site owned or controlled by the customer network302 a-302 b. For example, the site network 304 may be a network locatedin the customer network's 302 a-302 b office or campus. Alternatively oradditionally, the site network 304 may include network equipment ownedand/or operated by the customer network 302 a-302 b that may be locatedanywhere. For example, the customer networks' 302 a-302 b operations mayconsist of a few laptops owned by the customer networks 302 a-302 b,which are used from the private homes of the lap tops' users, from aco-working space, from a coffee shop, or from some other mobilelocation.

In various implementations, sensors 310 may be installed in the sitenetwork 304. The sensors 310 can be used by the network security systemto project deceptions into the site network 304, monitor the sitenetwork 304 for attacks, and/or to divert suspect attacks into thedeception center 308.

In some implementations, the sensors 310 may also be able to projectdeceptions into the part of the customer networks 302 a-302 b networkthat is provided by the cloud services provider 354. In most cases, itmay not be possible to install sensors 310 inside the network of thecloud services provider 354, but in some implementations, this may notbe necessary. For example, as discussed further below, the deceptioncenter 308 can acquire the subnet address of the network provided by thecloud services provider 354, and use that subnet address the createdeceptions. Though these deceptions are projected form the sensors 310installed in the site network 304, the deceptions may appear to bewithin the subnet provided by the cloud services provider 354.

In illustrated examples, the deception center 308 is installed insidethe customer networks 302 a-302 b. Though not illustrated here, thedeception center 308 can also be installed outside the customer networks302 a-302 b, such as for example somewhere on the Internet 350. In someimplementations, the deception center 308 may reside at the samelocation as the security service provider 306. When located outside thecustomer networks 302 a-302 b, the deception center 308 may connect tothe sensors 310 in the site network 304 over various public and/orprivate networks.

FIG. 3A illustrates an example of a configuration 300 a where thecustomer network's 302 a network infrastructure is located in the cloudand the customer network 302 a also has a substantial site network 304.In this example, the customer may have an office where the site network304 is located, and where the customer's employees access and use thecustomer network 302 a. For example, developers, sales and marketingpersonnel, human resources and finance employees, may access thecustomer network 302 a from the site network 304. In the illustratedexample, the customer may obtain applications and services from thecloud services provider 354. Alternatively or additionally, the cloudservices provider 354 may provide data center services for the customer.For example, the cloud services provider 354 may host the customer'srepository of data (e.g., music provided by a streaming music service,or video provided by a streaming video provider). In this example, thecustomer's own customers may be provided data directly from the cloudservices provider 354, rather than from the customer network 302 a.

FIG. 3B illustrates and example of a configuration 300 b where thecustomer network's 302 b network is primarily or sometimes entirely inthe cloud. In this example, the customer network's 302 b site network304 may include a few laptops, or one or two desktop servers. Thesecomputing devices may be used by the customer's employees to conduct thecustomer's business, while the cloud services provider 354 provides themajority of the network infrastructure needed by the customer. Forexample, a very small company may have no office space and no dedicatedlocation, and have as computing resources only the laptops used by itsemployees. This small company may use the cloud services provider 354 toprovide its fixed network infrastructure. The small company may accessthis network infrastructure by connecting a laptop to any availablenetwork connection (e.g, in a co-working space, library, or coffeeshop). When no laptops are connected to the cloud services provider 354,the customer network 302 b may be existing entirely within the cloud.

In the example provided above, the site network 304 can be foundwherever the customer's employees connect to a network and can accessthe cloud services provider 354. Similarly, the sensors 310 can beco-located with the employees' laptops. For example, whenever anemployee connects to a network, she can enable a sensor 310, which canthen project deceptions into the network around her. Alternatively oradditionally, sensors 310 can be installed in a fixed location (such asthe home of an employee of the customer) from which they can access thecloud services provider 354 and project deceptions into the networkprovided by the cloud services provider 354.

The network security system, such as the deception-based systemdiscussed above, can provide network security for a variety of customernetworks, which may include a diverse array of devices. FIG. 4illustrates an example of an enterprise network 400, which is one suchnetwork that can be defended by a network security system. The exampleenterprise network 400 illustrates examples of various network devicesand network clients that may be included in an enterprise network. Theenterprise network 400 may include more or fewer network devices and/ornetwork clients, and/or may include network devices, additional networksincluding remote sites 452, and/or systems not illustrated here.Enterprise networks may include networks installed at a large site, suchas a corporate office, a university campus, a hospital, a governmentoffice, or a similar entity. An enterprise network may include multiplephysical sites. Access to an enterprise networks is typicallyrestricted, and may require authorized users to enter a password orotherwise authenticate before using the network. A network such asillustrated by the example enterprise network 400 may also be found atsmall sites, such as in a small business.

The enterprise network 400 may be connected to an external network 450.The external network 450 may be a public network, such as the Internet.A public network is a network that has been made accessible to anydevice that can connect to it. A public network may have unrestrictedaccess, meaning that, for example, no password or other authenticationis required to connect to it. The external network 450 may includethird-party telecommunication lines, such as phone lines, broadcastcoaxial cable, fiber optic cables, satellite communications, cellularcommunications, and the like. The external network 450 may include anynumber of intermediate network devices, such as switches, routers,gateways, servers, and/or controllers that are not directly part of theenterprise network 400 but that facilitate communication between thenetwork 400 and other network-connected entities, such as a remote site452.

Remote sites 452 are networks and/or individual computers that aregenerally located outside the enterprise network 400, and which may beconnected to the enterprise network 400 through intermediate networks,but that function as if within the enterprise network 400 and connecteddirectly to it. For example, an employee may connect to the enterprisenetwork 400 while at home, using various secure protocols, and/or byconnecting to a Virtual Private Network (VPN) provided by the enterprisenetwork 400. While the employee's computer is connected, the employee'shome is a remote site 452. Alternatively or additionally, the enterprisenetwork's 400 owner may have a satellite office with a small internalnetwork. This satellite office's network may have a fixed connection tothe enterprise network 400 over various intermediate networks. Thissatellite office can also be considered a remote site.

The enterprise network 400 may be connected to the external network 450using a gateway device 404. The gateway device 404 may include afirewall or similar system for preventing unauthorized access whileallowing authorized access to the enterprise network 400. Examples ofgateway devices include routers, modems (e.g. cable, fiber optic,dial-up, etc.), and the like.

The gateway device 404 may be connected to a switch 406 a. The switch406 a provides connectivity between various devices in the enterprisenetwork 400. In this example, the switch 406 a connects together thegateway device 404, various servers 408, 412, 414, 416, 418, an anotherswitch 406 b. A switch typically has multiple ports, and functions todirect packets received on one port to another port. In someimplementations, the gateway device 404 and the switch 406 a may becombined into a single device.

Various servers may be connected to the switch 406 a. For example, aprint server 408 may be connected to the switch 406 a. The print server408 may provide network access to a number of printers 410. Clientdevices connected to the enterprise network 400 may be able to accessone of the printers 410 through the printer server 408.

Other examples of servers connected to the switch 406 a include a fileserver 412, database server 414, and email server 416. The file server412 may provide storage for and access to data. This data may beaccessible to client devices connected to the enterprise network 400.The database server 414 may store one or more databases, and provideservices for accessing the databases. The email server 416 may host anemail program or service, and may also store email for users on theenterprise network 400.

As yet another example, a server rack 418 may be connected to the switch406 a. The server rack 418 may house one or more rack-mounted servers.The server rack 418 may have one connection to the switch 406 a, or mayhave multiple connections to the switch 406 a. The servers in the serverrack 418 may have various purposes, including providing computingresources, file storage, database storage and access, and email, amongothers.

An additional switch 406 b may also be connected to the first switch 406a. The additional switch 406 b may be provided to expand the capacity ofthe network. A switch typically has a limited number of ports (e.g., 8,16, 32, 64 or more ports). In most cases, however, a switch can directtraffic to and from another switch, so that by connecting the additionalswitch 406 b to the first switch 406 a, the number of available portscan be expanded.

In this example, a server 420 is connected to the additional switch 406b. The server 420 may manage network access for a number of networkdevices or client devices. For example, the server 420 may providenetwork authentication, arbitration, prioritization, load balancing, andother management services as needed to manage multiple network devicesaccessing the enterprise network 400. The server 420 may be connected toa hub 422. The hub 422 may include multiple ports, each of which mayprovide a wired connection for a network or client device. A hub istypically a simpler device than a switch, and may be used whenconnecting a small number of network devices together. In some cases, aswitch can be substituted for the hub 422. In this example, the hub 422connects desktop computers 424 and laptop computers 426 to theenterprise network 400. In this example, each of the desktop computers424 and laptop computers 426 are connected to the hub 422 using aphysical cable.

In this example, the additional switch 406 b is also connected to awireless access point 428. The wireless access point 428 provideswireless access to the enterprise network 400 for wireless-enablednetwork or client devices. Examples of wireless-enabled network andclient devices include laptops 430, tablet computers 432, and smartphones 434, among others. In some implementations, the wireless accesspoint 428 may also provide switching and/or routing functionality.

The example enterprise network 400 of FIG. 4 is defended from networkthreats by a network threat detection and analysis system, which usesdeception security mechanisms to attract and divert attacks on thenetwork. The deceptive security mechanisms may be controlled by andinserted into the enterprise network 400 using a deception center 498and sensors 490, which may also be referred to as deception sensors,installed in various places in the enterprise network 400. In someimplementations, the deception center 498 and the sensors 490 interactwith a security services provider 496 located outside of the enterprisenetwork 400. The deception center 498 may also obtain or exchange datawith sources located on external networks 450, such as the Internet.

In various implementations, the sensors 490 are a minimal combination ofhardware and/or software, sufficient to form a network connection withthe enterprise network 400 and a network tunnel 480 with the deceptioncenter 498. For example, a sensor 490 may be constructed using alow-power processor, a network interface, and a simple operating system.

In some implementations, any of the devices in the enterprise network(e.g., the servers 408, 412, 416, 418 the printers 410, the computingdevices 424, 426, 430, 432, 434, or the network infrastructure devices404, 406 a, 406 b, 428) can be configured to act as a sensor.

In various implementations, one or more sensors 490 can be installedanywhere in the enterprise network 400, include being attached switches406 a, hubs 422, wireless access points 428, and so on. The sensors 490can further be configured to be part of one or more VLANs. The sensors490 provide the deception center 498 with visibility into the enterprisenetwork 400, such as for example being able to operate as a node in theenterprise network 400, and/or being able to present or projectdeceptive security mechanisms into the enterprise network 400.Additionally, in various implementations, the sensors 490 may provide aportal through which a suspected attack on the enterprise network 400can be redirected to the deception center 498.

The deception center 498 provides network security for the enterprisenetwork 400 by deploying security mechanisms into the enterprise network400, monitoring the enterprise network 400 through the securitymechanisms, detecting and redirecting apparent threats, and analyzingnetwork activity resulting from the apparent threat. To provide securityfor the enterprise network 400, in various implementations the deceptioncenter 498 may communicate with sensors 490 installed in the enterprisenetwork 400, using, for example, network tunnels 480. The tunnels 480may allow the deception center 498 to be located in a differentsub-network (“subnet”) than the enterprise network 400, on a differentnetwork, or remote from the enterprise network 400, with intermediatenetworks between the deception center 498 and the enterprise network400. In some implementations, the enterprise network 400 can includemore than one deception center 498. In some implementations, thedeception center may be located off-site, such as in an external network450.

In some implementations, the security services provider 496 may act as acentral hub for providing security to multiple site networks, possiblyincluding site networks controlled by different organizations. Forexample, the security services provider 496 may communicate withmultiple deception centers 498 that each provide security for adifferent enterprise network 400 for the same organization. As anotherexample, the security services provider 496 may coordinate theactivities of the deception center 498 and the sensors 490, such asenabling the deception center 498 and the sensors 490 to connect to eachother. In some implementations, the security services provider 496 islocated outside the enterprise network 400. In some implementations, thesecurity services provider 496 is controlled by a different entity thanthe entity that controls the site network. For example, the securityservices provider 496 may be an outside vendor. In some implementations,the security services provider 496 is controlled by the same entity asthat controls the enterprise network 400. In some implementations, thenetwork security system does not include a security services provider496.

FIG. 4 illustrates one example of what can be considered a “traditional”network, that is, a network that is based on the interconnection ofcomputers. In various implementations, a network security system, suchas the deception-based system discussed above, can also be used todefend “non-traditional” networks that include devices other thantraditional computers, such as for example mechanical, electrical, orelectromechanical devices, sensors, actuators, and control systems. Such“non-traditional” networks may be referred to as the Internet of Things(IoT). The Internet of Things encompasses newly-developed, every-daydevices designed to be networked (e.g., drones, self-drivingautomobiles, etc.) as well as common and long-established machinery thathas augmented to be connected to a network (e.g., home appliances,traffic signals, etc.).

FIG. 5 illustrates a general example of an IoT network 500. The exampleIoT network 500 can be implemented wherever sensors, actuators, andcontrol systems can be found. For example, the example IoT network 500can be implemented for buildings, roads and bridges, agriculture,transportation and logistics, utilities, air traffic control, factories,and private homes, among others. In various implementations, the IoTnetwork 500 includes cloud service 554 that collects data from varioussensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d, located in various locations. Usingthe collected data, the cloud service 554 can provide services 520,control of machinery and equipment 514, exchange of data withtraditional network devices 516, and/or exchange of data with userdevices 518. In some implementations, the cloud service 554 can workwith a deception center 598 and/or a security service provider 596 toprovide security for the network 500.

A cloud service, such as the illustrated cloud service 554, is aresource provided over the Internet 550. Sometimes synonymous with“cloud computing,” the resource provided by the cloud services is in the“cloud” in that the resource is provided by hardware and/or software atsome location remote from the place where the resource is used. Often,the hardware and software of the cloud service is distributed acrossmultiple physical locations. Generally, the resource provided by thecloud service is not directly associated with specific hardware orsoftware resources, such that use of the resource can continue when thehardware or software is changed. The resource provided by the cloudservice can often also be shared between multiple users of the cloudservice, without affecting each user's use. The resource can often alsobe provided as needed or on-demand. Often, the resource provided by thecloud service 554 is automated, or otherwise capable of operating withlittle or no assistance from human operators.

Examples of cloud services include software as a service (SaaS),infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS),desktop as a service (DaaS), managed software as a service (MSaaS),mobile backend as a service (MBaaS), and information technologymanagement as a service (ITMaas). Specific examples of cloud servicesinclude data centers, such as those operated by Amazon Web Services andGoogle Web Services, among others, that provide general networking andsoftware services. Other examples of cloud services include thoseassociated with smartphone applications, or “apps,” such as for exampleapps that track fitness and health, apps that allow a user to remotelymanage her home security system or thermostat, and networked gamingapps, among others. In each of these examples, the company that providesthe app may also provide cloud-based storage of application data,cloud-based software and computing resources, and/or networkingservices. In some cases, the company manages the cloud services providedby the company, including managing physical hardware resources. In othercases, the company leases networking time from a data center provider.

In some cases, the cloud service 554 is part of one integrated system,run by one entity. For example, the cloud service 554 can be part of atraffic control system. In this example, sensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512d can be used to monitor traffic and road conditions. In this example,the cloud service 554 can attempt to optimize the flow of traffic andalso provide traffic safety. For example, the sensors 510 a-510 d, 512a-512 d can include a sensor 512 a on a bridge that monitors iceformation. When the sensor 512 a detects that ice has formed on thebridge, the sensor 512 a can alert the cloud service 554. The cloudservice 554, can respond by interacting with machinery and equipment 514that manages traffic in the area of the bridge. For example, the cloudservice 554 can turn on warning signs, indicating to drivers that thebridge is icy. Generally, the interaction between the sensor 512 a, thecloud service 554, and the machinery and equipment 514 is automated,requiring little or no management by human operators.

In various implementations, the cloud service 554 collects or receivesdata from sensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d, distributed across one ormore networks. The sensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d include devicescapable of “sensing” information, such as air or water temperature, airpressure, weight, motion, humidity, fluid levels, noise levels, and soon. The sensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d can alternatively oradditionally include devices capable of receiving input, such ascameras, microphones, touch pads, keyboards, key pads, and so on. Insome cases, a group of sensors 510 a-510 d may be common to one customernetwork 502. For example, the sensors 510 a-510 d may be motion sensors,traffic cameras, temperature sensors, and other sensors for monitoringtraffic in a city's metro area. In this example, the sensors 510 a-510 dcan be located in one area of the city, or be distribute across thecity, and be connected to a common network. In these cases, the sensors510 a-510 d can communicate with a gateway device 562, such as a networkgateway. The gateway device 562 can further communicate with the cloudservice 554.

In some cases, in addition to receiving data from sensors 510 a-510 d inone customer network 502, the cloud service 554 can also receive datafrom sensors 512 a-512 d in other sites 504 a-504 c. These other sites504 a-504 c can be part of the same customer network 502 or can beunrelated to the customer network 502. For example, the other sites 504a-504 c can each be the metro area of a different city, and the sensors512 a-512 d can be monitoring traffic for each individual city.

Generally, communication between the cloud service 554 and the sensors510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d is bidirectional. For example, the sensors 510a-510 d, 512 a-512 d can send information to the cloud service 554. Thecloud service 554 can further provide configuration and controlinformation to the sensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d. For example, thecloud service 554 can enable or disable a sensor 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512d or modify the operation of a sensor 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d, such aschanging the format of the data provided by a sensor 510 a-510 d, 512a-512 d or upgrading the firmware of a sensor 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d.

In various implementations, the cloud service 554 can operate on thedata received from the sensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d, and use thisdata to interact with services 520 provided by the cloud service 554, orto interact with machinery and equipment 514, network devices 516,and/or user devices 518 available to the cloud service 554. Services 520can include software-based services, such as cloud-based applications,website services, or data management services. Services 520 canalternatively or additionally include media, such as streaming video ormusic or other entertainment services. Services 520 can also includedelivery and/or coordination of physical assets, such as for examplepackage delivery, direction of vehicles for passenger pick-up anddrop-off, or automate re-ordering and re-stocking of supplies. Invarious implementations, services 520 may be delivered to and used bythe machinery and equipment 514, the network devices 516, and/or theuser devices 518.

In various implementations, the machinery and equipment 514 can includephysical systems that can be controlled by the cloud service 554.Examples of machinery and equipment 514 include factory equipment,trains, electrical street cars, self-driving cars, traffic lights, gateand door locks, and so on. In various implementations, the cloud service554 can provide configuration and control of the machinery and equipment514 in an automated fashion.

The network devices 516 can include traditional networking equipment,such as server computers, data storage devices, routers, switches,gateways, and so on. In various implementations, the cloud service 554can provide control and management of the network devices 516, such asfor example automated upgrading of software, security monitoring, orasset tracking. Alternatively or additionally, in variousimplementations the cloud service 554 can exchange data with the networkdevices 516, such as for example providing websites, providing stocktrading data, or providing online shopping resources, among others.Alternatively or additionally, the network devices 516 can includecomputing systems used by the cloud service provider to manage the cloudservice 554.

The user devices 518 can include individual personal computers, smartphones, tablet devices, smart watches, fitness trackers, medicaldevices, and so on that can be associated with an individual user. Thecloud service 554 can exchange data with the user devices 518, such asfor example provide support for applications installed on the userdevices 518, providing websites, providing streaming media, providingdirectional navigation services, and so on. Alternatively oradditionally, the cloud service 554 may enable a user to use a userdevice 518 to access and/or view other devices, such as the sensors 510a-510 d, 512 a-512 d, the machinery and equipment 514, or the networkdevices 516.

In various implementations, the services 520, machinery and equipment514, network devices 516, and user devices 518 may be part of onecustomer network 506. In some cases, this customer network 506 is thesame as the customer network 502 that includes the sensors 510 a-510 d.In some cases, the services 520, machinery and equipment 514, networkdevices 516, and user devices 518 are part of the same network, and mayinstead be part of various other networks 506.

In various implementations, customer networks can include a deceptioncenter 598. The deception center 598 provides network security for theIoT network 500 by deploying security mechanisms into the IoT network500, monitoring the IoT network 500 through the security mechanisms,detecting and redirecting apparent threats, and analyzing networkactivity resulting from the apparent threat. To provide security for theIoT network 500, in various implementations the deception center 598 maycommunicate with the sensors 510 a-5106 d, 512 a-512 d installed in theIoT network 500, for example through the cloud service 554. In someimplementations, the IoT network 500 can include more than one deceptioncenter 598. For example, each of customer network 502 and customernetworks or other networks 506 can include a deception center 598.

In some implementations, the deception center 598 and the sensors 510a-510 d, 512 a-512 d interact with a security services provider 596. Insome implementations, the security services provider 596 may act as acentral hub for providing security to multiple site networks, possiblyincluding site networks controlled by different organizations. Forexample, the security services provider 596 may communicate withmultiple deception centers 598 that each provide security for adifferent IoT network 500 for the same organization. As another example,the security services provider 596 may coordinate the activities of thedeception center 598 and the sensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d, such asenabling the deception center 598 and the sensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512d to connect to each other. In some implementations, the securityservices provider 596 is integrated into the cloud service 554. In someimplementations, the security services provider 596 is controlled by adifferent entity than the entity that controls the site network. Forexample, the security services provider 596 may be an outside vendor. Insome implementations, the security services provider 596 is controlledby the same entity as that controls the IoT network 500. In someimplementations, the network security system does not include a securityservices provider 596.

IoT networks can also include small networks of non-traditional devices.FIG. 6 illustrates an example of a customer network that is a smallnetwork 600, here implemented in a private home. A network for a home isan example of small network that may have both traditional andnon-traditional network devices connected to the network 600, in keepingwith an Internet of Things approach. Home networks are also an exampleof networks that are often implemented with minimal security. Theaverage homeowner is not likely to be a sophisticated network securityexpert, and may rely on his modem or router to provide at least somebasic security. The homeowner, however, is likely able to at least setup a basic home network. A deception-based network security device maybe as simple to set up as a home router or base station, yet providesophisticated security for the network 600.

The example network 600 of FIG. 6 may be a single network, or mayinclude multiple sub-networks. These sub-networks may or may notcommunicate with each other. For example, the network 600 may include asub-network that uses the electrical wiring in the house as acommunication channel. Devices configured to communicate in this way mayconnect to the network using electrical outlets, which also provide thedevices with power. The sub-network may include a central controllerdevice, which may coordinate the activities of devices connected to theelectrical network, including turning devices on and off at particulartimes. One example of a protocol that uses the electrical wiring as acommunication network is X10.

The network 600 may also include wireless and wired networks, built intothe home or added to the home solely for providing a communicationmedium for devices in the house. Examples of wireless, radio-basednetworks include networks using protocols such as Z-Wave™, Zigbee™ (alsoknown as Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)802.15.4), Bluetooth™, and Wi-Fi (also known as IEEE 802.11), amongothers. Wireless networks can be set up by installing a wireless basestation in the house. Alternatively or additionally, a wireless networkcan be established by having at least two devices in the house that areable to communicate with each other using the same protocol.

Examples of wired networks include Ethernet (also known as IEEE 802.3),token ring (also known as IEEE 802.5), Fiber Distributed Data Interface(FDDI), and Attached Resource Computer Network (ARCNET), among others. Awired network can be added to the house by running cabling through thewalls, ceilings, and/or floors, and placing jacks in various rooms thatdevices can connect to with additional cables. The wired network can beextended using routers, switches, and/or hubs. In many cases, wirednetworks may be interconnected with wireless networks, with theinterconnected networks operating as one seamless network. For example,an Ethernet network may include a wireless base station that provides aWi-Fi signal for devices in the house.

As noted above, a small network 600 implemented in a home is one thatmay include both traditional network devices and non-traditional,everyday electronics and appliances that have also been connected to thenetwork 600. Examples of rooms where one may find non-traditionaldevices connected to the network are the kitchen and laundry rooms. Forexample, in the kitchen a refrigerator 604, oven 606, microwave 608, anddishwasher 610 may be connected to the network 600, and in the laundryroom a washing machine 612 may be connected to the network 600. Byattaching these appliances to the network 600, the homeowner can monitorthe activity of each device (e.g., whether the dishes are clean, thecurrent state of a turkey in the oven, or the washing machine cycle) orchange the operation of each device without needing to be in the sameroom or even be at home. The appliances can also be configured toresupply themselves. For example, the refrigerator 604 may detect that acertain product is running low, and may place an order with a grocerydelivery service for the product to be restocked.

The network 600 may also include environmental appliances, such as athermostat 602 and a water heater 614. By having these devices connectedto the network 600, the homeowner can monitor the current environment ofthe house (e.g., the air temperature or the hot water temperature), andadjust the settings of these appliances while at home or away.Furthermore, software on the network 600 or on the Internet 650 maytrack energy usage for the heating and cooling units and the waterheater 614. This software may also track energy usage for the otherdevices, such as the kitchen and laundry room appliances. The energyusage of each appliance may be available to the homeowner over thenetwork 600.

In the living room, various home electronics may be on the network 600.These electronics may have once been fully analog or may have beenstandalone devices, but now include a network connection for exchangingdata with other devices in the network 600 or with the Internet 650. Thehome electronics in this example include a television 618, a gamingsystem 620, and a media device 622 (e.g., a video and/or audio player).Each of these devices may play media hosted, for example, on networkattached storage 636 located elsewhere in the network 600, or mediahosted on the Internet 650.

The network 600 may also include home safety and security devices, suchas a smoke detector 616, an electronic door lock 624, and a homesecurity system 626. Having these devices on the network may allow thehomeowner to track the information monitored and/or sensed by thesedevices, both when the homeowner is at home and away from the house. Forexample, the homeowner may be able to view a video feed from a securitycamera 628. When the safety and security devices detect a problem, theymay also inform the homeowner. For example, the smoke detector 616 maysend an alert to the homeowner's smartphone when it detects smoke, orthe electronic door lock 624 may alert the homeowner when there has beena forced entry. Furthermore, the homeowner may be able to remotelycontrol these devices. For example, the homeowner may be able toremotely open the electronic door lock 624 for a family member who hasbeen locked out. The safety and security devices may also use theirconnection to the network to call the fire department or police ifnecessary.

Another non-traditional device that may be found in the network 600 isthe family car 630. The car 630 is one of many devices, such as laptopcomputers 638, tablet computers 646, and smartphones 642, that connectto the network 600 when at home, and when not at home, may be able toconnect to the network 600 over the Internet 650. Connecting to thenetwork 600 over the Internet 650 may provide the homeowner with remoteaccess to his network. The network 600 may be able to provideinformation to the car 630 and receive information from the car 630while the car is away. For example, the network 600 may be able to trackthe location of the car 630 while the car 630 is away.

In the home office and elsewhere around the house, this example network600 includes some traditional devices connected to the network 600. Forexample, the home office may include a desktop computer 632 and networkattached storage 636. Elsewhere around the house, this example includesa laptop computer 638 and handheld devices such as a tablet computer 646and a smartphone 642. In this example, a person 640 is also connected tothe network 600. The person 640 may be connected to the network 600wirelessly through personal devices worn by the person 640, such as asmart watch, fitness tracker, or heart rate monitor. The person 640 mayalternatively or additionally be connected to the network 600 through anetwork-enabled medical device, such as a pacemaker, heart monitor, ordrug delivery system, which may be worn or implanted.

The desktop computer 632, laptop computer 638, tablet computer 646,and/or smartphone 642 may provide an interface that allows the homeownerto monitor and control the various devices connected to the network.Some of these devices, such as the laptop computer 638, the tabletcomputer 646, and the smartphone 642 may also leave the house, andprovide remote access to the network 600 over the Internet 650. In manycases, however, each device on the network may have its own software formonitoring and controlling only that one device. For example, thethermostat 602 may use one application while the media device 622 usesanother, and the wireless network provides yet another. Furthermore, itmay be the case that the various sub-networks in the house do notcommunicate with each other, and/or are viewed and controlled usingsoftware that is unique to each sub-network. In many cases, thehomeowner may not have one unified and easily understood view of hisentire home network 600.

The small network 600 in this example may also include networkinfrastructure devices, such as a router or switch (not shown) and awireless base station 634. The wireless base station 634 may provide awireless network for the house. The router or switch may provide a wirednetwork for the house. The wireless base station 634 may be connected tothe router or switch to provide a wireless network that is an extensionof the wired network. The router or switch may be connected to a gatewaydevice 648 that connects the network 600 to other networks, includingthe Internet 650. In some cases, a router or switch may be integratedinto the gateway device 648. The gateway device 648 is a cable modem,digital subscriber line (DSL) modem, optical modem, analog modem, orsome other device that connects the network 600 to an Internet ServiceProvider (ISP). The ISP may provide access to the Internet 650.Typically, a home network only has one gateway device 648. In somecases, the network 600 may not be connected to any networks outside ofthe house. In these cases, information about the network 600 and controlof devices in the network 600 may not be available when the homeowner isnot connected to the network 600; that is, the homeowner may not haveaccess to his network 600 over the Internet 650.

Typically, the gateway device 648 includes a hardware and/or softwarefirewall. A firewall monitors incoming and outgoing network traffic and,by applying security rules to the network traffic, attempts to keepharmful network traffic out of the network 600. In many cases, afirewall is the only security system protecting the network 600. While afirewall may work for some types of intrusion attempts originatingoutside the network 600, the firewall may not block all intrusionmechanisms, particularly intrusions mechanisms hidden in legitimatenetwork traffic. Furthermore, while a firewall may block intrusionsoriginating on the Internet 650, the firewall may not detect intrusionsoriginating from within the network 600. For example, an infiltrator mayget into the network 600 by connecting to signal from the Wi-Fi basestation 634. Alternatively, the infiltrator may connect to the network600 by physically connecting, for example, to the washing machine 612.The washing machine 612 may have a port that a service technician canconnect to service the machine. Alternatively or additionally, thewashing machine 612 may have a simple Universal Serial Bus (USB) port.Once an intruder has gained access to the washing machine 612, theintruder may have access to the rest of the network 600.

To provide more security for the network 600, a deception-based networksecurity device 660 can be added to the network 600. In someimplementations, the security device 660 is a standalone device that canbe added to the network 600 by connecting it to a router or switch. Insome implementations, the security device 660 can alternatively oradditionally be connected to the network's 600 wireless sub-network bypowering on the security device 660 and providing it with Wi-Ficredentials. The security device 660 may have a touchscreen, or a screenand a keypad, for inputting Wi-Fi credentials. Alternatively oradditionally, the homeowner may be able to enter network informationinto the security device by logging into the security device 660 over aBluetooth™ or Wi-Fi signal using software on a smartphone, tablet, orlaptop, or using a web browser. In some implementations, the securitydevice 660 can be connected to a sub-network running over the home'selectrical wiring by connecting the security device 660 to a poweroutlet. In some implementations, the security device 660 may have ports,interfaces, and/or radio antennas for connecting to the varioussub-networks that can be included in the network 600. This may beuseful, for example, when the sub-networks do not communicate with eachother, or do not communicate with each other seamlessly. Once powered onand connected, the security device 660 may self-configure and monitorthe security of each sub-network in the network 600 that it is connectedto.

In some implementations, the security device 660 may be configured toconnect between the gateway device 648 and the network's 600 primaryrouter, and/or between the gateway device 648 and the gateway device's648 connection to the wall. Connected in one or both of these locations,the security device 660 may be able to control the network's 600connection with outside networks. For example, the security device candisconnect the network 600 from the Internet 650.

In some implementations, the security device 660, instead of beingimplemented as a standalone device, may be integrated into one or moreof the appliances, home electronics, or computing devices (in thisexample network 600), or in some other device not illustrated here. Forexample, the security device 660—or the functionality of the securitydevice 660—may be incorporated into the gateway device 648 or a desktopcomputer 632 or a laptop computer 638. As another example, the securitydevice 660 can be integrated into a kitchen appliance (e.g., therefrigerator 604 or microwave 608), a home media device (e.g., thetelevision 618 or gaming system 620), or the home security system 626.In some implementations, the security device 660 may be a printedcircuit board that can be added to another device without requiringsignificant changes to the other device. In some implementations, thesecurity device 660 may be implemented using an Application SpecificIntegrated Circuit (ASIC) or Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) thatcan be added to the electronics of a device. In some implementations,the security device 660 may be implemented as a software module ormodules that can run concurrently with the operating system or firmwareof a networked device. In some implementations, the security device 660may have a physical or virtual security barrier that prevents access toit by the device that it is integrated into. In some implementations,the security device's 660 presence in another device may be hidden fromthe device into which the security device 660 is integrated.

In various implementations, the security device 660 may scan the network600 to determine which devices are present in the network 600.Alternatively or additionally, the security device 660 may communicatewith a central controller in the network 600 (or multiple centralcontrollers, when there are sub-networks, each with their own centralcontroller) to learn which devices are connected to the network 600. Insome implementations, the security device 660 may undergo a learningperiod, during which the security device 660 learns the normal activityof the network 600, such as what time of day appliances and electronicsare used, what they are used for, and/or what data is transferred to andfrom these devices. During the learning period, the security device 660may alert the homeowner to any unusual or suspicious activity. Thehomeowner may indicate that this activity is acceptable, or may indicatethat the activity is an intrusion. As described below, the securitydevice 660 may subsequently take preventive action against theintrusion.

Once the security device 660 has learned the topology and/or activity ofthe network 600, the security device 660 may be able to providedeception-based security for the network 600. In some implementations,the security device 660 may deploy security mechanisms that areconfigured to emulate devices that could be found in the network 600. Insome implementations, the security device 660 may monitor activity onthe network 600, including watching the data sent between the variousdevices on the network 600, and between the devices and the Internet650. The security device 660 may be looking for activity that isunusual, unexpected, or readily identifiable as suspect. Upon detectingsuspicious activity in the network 600, the security device 660 maydeploy deceptive security mechanisms.

In some implementations, the deceptive security mechanisms are softwareprocesses running on the security device 660 that emulate devices thatmay be found in the network 600. In some implementations, the securitydevice 660 may be assisted in emulating the security devices by anotherdevice on the network 600, such as the desktop computer 632. From theperspective of devices connected to the network 600, the securitymechanisms appear just like any other device on the network, including,for example, having an Internet Protocol (IP) address, a Media AccessControl (MAC) address, and/or some other identification information,having an identifiable device type, and responding to or transmittingdata just as would the device being emulated. The security mechanismsmay be emulated by the security device 660 itself; thus, while, from thepoint of view of the network 600, the network 600 appears to haveadditional devices, no physical equivalent (other than the securitydevice 660) can be found in the house.

The devices and data emulated by a security mechanism are selected suchthat the security mechanism is an attractive target for intrusionattempts. Thus, the security mechanism may emulate valuable data, and/ordevices that are easily hacked into, and/or devices that provide easyaccess to the reset of the network 600. Furthermore, the securitymechanisms emulate devices that are likely to be found in the network600, such as a second television, a second thermostat, or another laptopcomputer. In some implementations, the security device 660 may contact aservice on the Internet 650 for assistance in selecting devices toemulate and/or for how to configure emulated devices. The securitydevices 660 may select and configure security mechanisms to beattractive to intrusions attempts, and to deflect attention away frommore valuable or vulnerable network assets. Additionally, the securitymechanisms can assist in confirming that an intrusion into the network600 has actually taken place.

In some implementations, the security device 660 may deploy deceptivesecurity mechanisms in advance of detecting any suspicious activity. Forexample, having scanned the network, the security device 660 maydetermine that the network 600 includes only one television 618 and onesmoke detector 616. The security device 660 may therefore choose todeploy security mechanisms that emulate a second television and a secondsmoke detector. With security mechanisms preemptively added to thenetwork, when there is an intrusion attempt, the intruder may target thesecurity mechanisms instead of valuable or vulnerable network devices.The security mechanisms thus may serve as decoys and may deflect anintruder away from the network's 600 real devices.

In some implementations, the security mechanisms deployed by thesecurity device 660 may take into account specific requirements of thenetwork 600 and/or the type of devices that can be emulated. Forexample, in some cases, the network 600 (or a sub-network) may assignidentifiers to each device connected to the network 600, and/or eachdevice may be required to adopt a unique identifier. In these cases, thesecurity device 660 may assign an identifier to deployed securitymechanisms that do not interfere with identifiers used by actual devicesin the network 600. As another example, in some cases, devices on thenetwork 600 may register themselves with a central controller and/orwith a central service on the Internet 650. For example, the thermostat602 may register with a service on the Internet 650 that monitors energyuse for the home. In these cases, the security mechanisms that emulatethese types of devices may also register with the central controller orthe central service. Doing so may improve the apparent authenticity ofthe security mechanism, and may avoid conflicts with the centralcontroller or central service. Alternatively or additionally, thesecurity device 660 may determine to deploy security mechanisms thatemulate other devices, and avoid registering with the central controlleror central service.

In some implementations, the security device 660 may dynamically adjustthe security mechanisms that it has deployed. For example, when thehomeowner adds devices to the network 600, the security device 660 mayremove security mechanisms that conflict with the new devices, or changea security mechanism so that the security mechanism's configuration isnot incongruous with the new devices (e.g., the security mechanismsshould not have the same MAC address as a new device). As anotherexample, when the network owner removes a device from the network 600,the security device 660 may add a security mechanism that mimics thedevice that was removed. As another example, the security device maychange the activity of a security mechanism, for example, to reflectchanges in the normal activity of the home, changes in the weather, thetime of year, the occurrence of special events, and so on.

The security device 660 may also dynamically adjust the securitymechanisms it has deployed in response to suspicious activity it hasdetected on the network 600. For example, upon detecting suspiciousactivity, the security device 660 may change the behavior of a securitymechanism or may deploy additional security mechanisms. The changes tothe security mechanisms may be directed by the suspicious activity,meaning that if, for example, the suspicious activity appears to beprobing for a wireless base station 634, the security device 660 maydeploy a decoy wireless base station.

Changes to the security mechanisms are meant not only to attract apossible intrusion, but also to confirm that an intrusion has, in factoccurred. Since the security mechanisms are not part of the normaloperation of the network 600, normal occupants of the home are notexpected to access the security mechanisms. Thus, in most cases, anyaccess of a security mechanism is suspect. Once the security device 660has detected an access to a security mechanism, the security device 660may next attempt to confirm that an intrusion into the network 600 hastaken place. An intrusion can be confirmed, for example, by monitoringactivity at the security mechanism. For example, login attempts, probingof data emulated by the security mechanism, copying of data from thesecurity mechanism, and attempts to log into another part of the network600 from the security mechanism indicate a high likelihood that anintrusion has occurred.

Once the security device 660 is able to confirm an intrusion into thenetwork 600, the security device 660 may alert the homeowner. Forexample, the security device 660 may sound an audible alarm, send anemail or text message to the homeowner or some other designated persons,and/or send an alert to an application running on a smartphone ortablet. As another example, the security device 660 may access othernetwork devices and, for example, flash lights, trigger the securitysystem's 626 alarm, and/or display messages on devices that includedisplay screens, such as the television 618 or refrigerator 604. In someimplementations, depending on the nature of the intrusion, the securitydevice 660 may alert authorities such as the police or fire department.

In some implementations, the security device 660 may also takepreventive actions. For example, when an intrusion appears to haveoriginated outside the network 600, the security device 660 may blockthe network's 600 access to the Internet 650, thus possibly cutting offthe intrusion. As another example, when the intrusion appears to haveoriginated from within the network 600, the security device 660 mayisolate any apparently compromised devices, for example by disconnectingthem from the network 600. When only its own security mechanisms arecompromised, the security device 660 may isolate itself from the rest ofthe network 600. As another example, when the security device 660 isable to determine that the intrusion very likely included physicalintrusion into the house, the security device 660 may alert theauthorities. The security device 660 may further lock down the house by,for example, locking any electronic door locks 624.

In some implementations, the security device 660 may be able to enable ahomeowner to monitor the network 600 when a suspicious activity has beendetected, or at any other time. For example, the homeowner may beprovided with a software application that can be installed on asmartphone, tablet, desktop, and/or laptop computer. The softwareapplication may receive information from the security device 660 over awired or wireless connection. Alternatively or additionally, thehomeowner may be able to access information about his network through aweb browser, where the security device 660 formats webpages fordisplaying the information. Alternatively or additionally, the securitydevice 660 may itself have a touchscreen or a screen and key pad thatprovide information about the network 600 to the homeowner.

The information provided to the homeowner may include, for example, alist and/or graphic display of the devices connected to the network 600.The information may further provide a real-time status of each device,such as whether the device is on or off, the current activity of thedevice, data being transferred to or from the device, and/or the currentuser of the device, among other things. The list or graphic display mayupdate as devices connect and disconnect from the network 600, such asfor example laptops and smartphones connecting to or disconnecting froma wireless sub-network in the network 600. The security device 660 mayfurther alert the homeowner when a device has unexpectedly beendisconnected from the network 600. The security device 660 may furtheralert the homeowner when an unknown device connects to the network 600,such as for example when a device that is not known to the homeownerconnects to the Wi-Fi signal.

The security device 660 may also maintain historic information. Forexample, the security device 660 may provide snapshots of the network600 taken once a day, once a week, or once a month. The security device660 may further provide a list of devices that have, for example,connected to the wireless signal in the last hour or day, at what times,and for how long. The security device 660 may also be able to provideidentification information for these devices, such as MAC addresses orusernames. As another example, the security device 660 may also maintainusage statistics for each device in the network 600, such as for examplethe times at which each device was in use, what the device was used for,how much energy the device used, and so on.

The software application or web browser or display interface thatprovides the homeowner with information about his network 600 may alsoenable the homeowner to make changes to the network 600 or to devices inthe network 600. For example, through the security device 660, thehomeowner may be able to turn devices on or off, change theconfiguration of a device, change a password for a device or for thenetwork, and so on.

In some implementations, the security device 660 may also displaycurrently deployed security mechanisms and their configuration. In someimplementations, the security device 660 may also display activity seenat the security mechanisms, such as for example a suspicious access to asecurity mechanism. In some implementations, the security device 660 mayalso allow the homeowner to customize the security mechanisms. Forexample, the homeowner may be able to add or remove security mechanisms,modify data emulated by the security mechanisms, modify theconfiguration of security mechanism, and/or modify the activity of asecurity mechanism.

A deception-based network security device 660 thus can providesophisticated security for a small network. The security device 660 maybe simple to add to a network, yet provide comprehensive protectionagainst both external and internal intrusions. Moreover, the securitydevice 660 may be able to monitor multiple sub-networks that are eachusing different protocols. The security device 660, using deceptivesecurity mechanisms, may be able to detect and confirm intrusions intothe network 600. The security device 660 may be able to take preventiveactions when an intrusion occurs. The security device 660 may also beable to provide the homeowner with information about his network, andpossibly also control over devices in the network.

FIG. 7 illustrates another example of a small network 700, hereimplemented in a small business. A network in a small business may haveboth traditional and non-traditional devices connected to the network700. Small business networks are also examples of networks that areoften implemented with minimal security. A small business owner may nothave the financial or technical resources, time, or expertise toconfigure a sophisticated security infrastructure for her network 700.The business owner, however, is likely able to at least set up a network700 for the operation of the business. A deception-based networksecurity device that is at least as simple to set up as the network 700itself may provide inexpensive and simple yet sophisticated security forthe network 700.

The example network 700 may be one, single network, or may includemultiple sub-networks. For example, the network 700 may include a wiredsub-network, such as an Ethernet network, and a wireless sub-network,such as an 802.11 Wi-Fi network. The wired sub-network may beimplemented using cables that have been run through the walls and/orceilings to the various rooms in the business. The cables may beconnected to jacks in the walls that devices can connect to in order toconnect to the network 700. The wireless network may be implementedusing a wireless base station 720, or several wireless base stations,which provide a wireless signal throughout the business. The network 700may include other wireless sub-networks, such as a short-distanceBluetooth™ network. In some cases, the sub-networks communicate with oneanother. For example, the Wi-Fi sub-network may be connected to thewired Ethernet sub-network. In some cases, the various sub-networks inthe network 700 may not be configured to or able to communicate witheach other.

As noted above, the small business network 700 may include bothcomputers, network infrastructure devices, and other devices nottraditionally found in a network. The network 700 may also includeelectronics, machinery, and systems that have been connected to thenetwork 700 according to an Internet-of-Things approach. Workshopmachinery that was once purely analog may now have computer controls.Digital workshop equipment may be network-enabled. By connecting shopequipment and machinery to the network 700, automation and efficiency ofthe business can be improved and orders, materials, and inventory can betracked. Having more devices on the network 700, however, may increasethe number of vulnerabilities in the network 700. Devices that have onlyrecently become network-enabled may be particularly vulnerable becausetheir security systems have not yet been hardened through use andattack. A deception-based network security device may providesimple-to-install and sophisticated security for a network that mayotherwise have only minimal security.

The example small business of FIG. 7 includes a front office. In thefront office, the network may include devices for administrative tasks.These devices may include, for example, a laptop computer 722 and atelephone 708. These devices may be attached to the network 700 in orderto, for example, access records related to the business, which may bestored on a server 732 located elsewhere in the building. In the frontoffice, security devices for the building may also be found, including,for example, security system controls 724 and an electronic door lock726. Having the security devices on the network 700 may enable thebusiness owner to remotely control access to the building. The businessowner may also be able to remotely monitor the security of building,such as for example being able to view video streams from securitycameras 742. The front office may also be where environmental controls,such as a thermostat 702, are located. Having the thermostat 702 on thenetwork 700 may allow the business owner to remotely control thetemperature settings. A network-enabled thermostat 702 may also trackenergy usage for the heating and cooling systems. The front office mayalso include safety devices, such as a network-connected smoke alarm728. A network-connected smoke alarm may be able to inform the businessowner that there is a problem in the building be connecting to thebusiness owner's smartphone or computer.

Another workspace in this example small business is a workshop. In theworkshop, the network 700 may include production equipment for producingthe goods sold by the business. The production equipment may include,for example, manufacturing machines 704 (e.g. a milling machine, aComputer Numerical Control (CNC) machine, a 3D printer, or some othermachine tool) and a plotter 706. The production equipment may becontrolled by a computer on the network 700, and/or may receive productdesigns over the network 700 and independently execute the designs. Inthe workshop, one may also find other devices related to themanufacturing of products, such as radiofrequency identification (RFID)scanners, barcode or Quick Response (QR) code generators, and otherdevices for tracking inventory, as well as electronic tools, hand tools,and so on.

In the workshop and elsewhere in the building, mobile computing devicesand people 738 may also be connected to the network 700. Mobilecomputing devices include, for example, tablet computers 734 andsmartphones 736. These devices may be used to control productionequipment, track supplies and inventory, receive and track orders,and/or for other operations of the business. People 738 may be connectedto the network through network-connected devices worn or implanted inthe people 738, such as for example smart watches, fitness trackers,heart rate monitors, drug delivery systems, pacemakers, and so on.

At a loading dock, the example small business may have a delivery van748 and a company car 746. When these vehicles are away from thebusiness, they may be connected to the network 700 remotely, for exampleover the Internet 750. By being able to communicate with the network700, the vehicles may be able to receive information such as productdelivery information (e.g., orders, addresses, and/or delivery times),supply pickup instructions, and so on. The business owner may also beable to track the location of these vehicles from the business location,or over the Internet 750 when away from the business, and/or track whois using the vehicles.

The business may also have a back office. In the back office, thenetwork 700 may include traditional network devices, such as computers730, a multi-function printer 716, a scanner 718, and a server 732. Inthis example, the computers 730 may be used to design products formanufacturing in the workshop, as well as for management of thebusiness, including tracking orders, supplies, inventory, and/or humanresources records. The multi-function printer 716 and scanner 718 maysupport the design work and the running of the business. The server 732may store product designs, orders, supply records, and inventoryrecords, as well as administrative data, such as accounting and humanresources data.

The back office may also be where a gateway device 770 is located. Thegateway device 770 connects the small business to other networks,including the Internet 750. Typically, the gateway device 770 connectsto an ISP, and the ISP provides access to the Internet 750. In somecases, a router may be integrated into the gateway device 770. In somecases, gateway device 770 may be connected to an external router,switch, or hub, not illustrated here. In some cases, the network 700 isnot connected to any networks outside of the business's own network 700.In these cases, the network 700 may not have a gateway device 770.

The back office is also where the network 700 may have a deception-basednetwork security device 760. The security device 760 may be a standalonedevice that may be enabled as soon as it is connected to the network700. Alternatively or additionally, the security device 760 may beintegrated into another device connected to the network 700, such as thegateway device 770, a router, a desktop computer 730, a laptop computer722, the multi-function printer 716, or the thermostat 702, amongothers. When integrated into another device, the security device 760 mayuse the network connection of the other device, or may have its ownnetwork connection for connecting to the network 700. The securitydevice 760 may connect to the network 700 using a wired connection or awireless connection.

Once connected to the network 700, the security device 760 may beginmonitoring the network 700 for suspect activity. In someimplementations, the security device 760 may scan the network 700 tolearn which devices are connected to the network 700. In some cases, thesecurity device 760 may learn the normal activity of the network 700,such as what time the various devices are used, for how long, by whom,for what purpose, and what data is transferred to and from each device,among other things.

In some implementations, having learned the configuration and/oractivity of the network 700, the security device 760 may deploydeceptive security mechanisms. These security mechanisms may emulatedevices that may be found on the network 700, including having anidentifiable device type and/or network identifiers (such as a MACaddress and/or IP address), and being able to send and receive networktraffic that a device of a certain time would send and receive. Forexample, for the example small business, the security device 760 mayconfigure a security mechanism to emulate a 3D printer, a wide-bodyscanner, or an additional security camera. The security device 760 mayfurther avoid configuring a security mechanism to emulate a device thatis not likely to be found in the small business, such as a washingmachine. The security device 760 may use the deployed securitymechanisms to monitor activity on the network 700.

In various implementations, when the security device 760 detects suspectactivity, the security device 760 may deploy additional securitymechanisms. These additional security mechanisms may be selected basedon the nature of suspect activity. For example, when the suspectactivity appears to be attempting to break into the shop equipment, thesecurity device 760 may deploy a security mechanism that looks like shopequipment that is easy to hack. In some implementations, the securitydevice 760 may deploy security mechanisms only after detecting suspectactivity on the network 700.

The security device 760 selects devices to emulate that are particularlyattractive for an infiltration, either because the emulated deviceappears to have valuable data or because the emulated device appears tobe easy to infiltrate, or for some other reason. In someimplementations, the security device 760 connects to a service on theInternet 750 for assistance in determining which devices to emulateand/or how to configure the emulated device. Once deployed, the securitymechanisms serve as decoys to attract the attention of a possibleinfiltrator away from valuable network assets. In some implementations,the security device 760 emulates the security mechanisms using softwareprocesses. In some implementations, the security device 760 may beassisted in emulating security mechanisms by a computer 730 on thenetwork.

In some implementations, the security device 760 may deploy securitymechanisms prior to detecting suspicious activity on the network 700. Inthese implementations, the security mechanisms may present moreattractive targets for a possible, future infiltration, so that if aninfiltration occurs, the infiltrator will go after the securitymechanisms instead of the actual devices on the network 700.

In various implementations, the security device 760 may also change thesecurity mechanisms that it has deployed. For example, the securitydevice 760 may add or remove security mechanisms as the operation of thebusiness changes, as the activity on the network 700 changes, as devicesare added or removed from the network 700, as the time of year changes,and so on.

Besides deflecting a possible network infiltration away from valuable orvulnerable network devices, the security device 760 may use the securitymechanisms to confirm that the network 700 has been infiltrated. Becausethe security mechanisms are not part of actual devices in use by thebusiness, any access to them over the network is suspect. Thus, once thesecurity device 760 detects an access to one of its security mechanisms,the security device 760 may attempt to confirm that this access is, infact, an unauthorized infiltration of the network 700.

To confirm that a security mechanism has been infiltrated, the securitydevice 760 may monitor activity seen at the security mechanism. Thesecurity device 760 may further deploy additional security mechanisms,to see if, for example, it can present an even more attractive target tothe possible infiltrator. The security device 760 may further look forcertain activity, such as log in attempts to other devices in thenetwork, attempts to examine data on the security mechanism, attempts tomove data from the security mechanism to the Internet 750, scanning ofthe network 700, password breaking attempts, and so on.

Once the security device 760 has confirmed that the network 700 has beeninfiltrated, the security device 760 may alert the business owner. Forexample, the security device 760 may sound an audible alarm, email orsend text messages to the computers 730 and/or handheld devices 734,736, send a message to the business's cars 746, 748, flash lights, ortrigger the security system's 724 alarm. In some implementations, thesecurity device 760 may also take preventive measures. For example, thesecurity device 760 may disconnect the network 700 from the Internet750, may disconnect specific devices from the network 700 (e.g., theserver 732 or the manufacturing machines 704), may turn somenetwork-connected devices off, and/or may lock the building.

In various implementations, the security device 760 may allow thebusiness owner to monitor her network 700, either when an infiltrationis taking place or at any other time. For example, the security device760 may provide a display of the devices currently connected to thenetwork 700, including flagging any devices connected to the wirelessnetwork that do not appear to be part of the business. The securitydevice 760 may further display what each device is currently doing, whois using them, how much energy each device is presently using, and/orhow much network bandwidth each device is using. The security device 760may also be able to store this information and provide historicconfiguration and/or usage of the network 700.

The security device 760 may have a display it can use to showinformation to the business owner. Alternatively or additionally, thesecurity device 760 may provide this information to a softwareapplication that can run on a desktop or laptop computer, a tablet, or asmartphone. Alternatively or additionally, the security device 760 mayformat this information for display through a web browser. The businessowner may further be able to control devices on the network 700 throughan interface provided by the security device 760, including, forexample, turning devices on or off, adjusting settings on devices,configuring user accounts, and so on. The business owner may also beable to view any security mechanisms presently deployed, and may be ableto re-configure the security mechanisms, turn them off, or turn them on.

IoT networks can also include industrial control systems. Industrialcontrol system is a general term that encompasses several types ofcontrol systems, including supervisory control and data acquisition(SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS) and other controlsystem configurations, such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs),often found in the industrial sectors and infrastructures. Industrialcontrol systems are often found in industries such as electrical, waterand wastewater, oil and natural gas, chemical, transportation,pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, and discretemanufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods). While alarge percentage of industrial control systems may be privately ownedand operated, federal agencies also operate many industrial processes,such as air traffic control systems and materials handling (e.g., PostalService mail handling).

FIG. 8 illustrates an example of the basic operation of an industrialcontrol system 800. Generally, an industrial control system 800 mayinclude a control loop 802, a human-machine interface 806, and remotediagnostics and maintenance 808. In some implementations, the exampleindustrial control system can be defended by a network threat detectionand analysis system, which can include a deception center 898 and asecurity services provider 896.

A control loop 802 may consist of sensors 812, controller 804 hardwaresuch as PLCs, actuators 810, and the communication of variables 832,834. The sensors 812 may be used for measuring variables in the system,while the actuators 810 may include, for example, control valvesbreakers, switches, and motors. Some of the sensors 812 may bedeceptions sensors. Controlled variables 834 may be transmitted to thecontroller 804 from the sensors 812. The controller 804 may interpretthe controlled variables 834 and generates corresponding manipulatedvariables 832, based on set points provided by controller interaction830. The controller 804 may then transmit the manipulated variables 832to the actuators 810. The actuators 810 may drive a controlled process814 (e.g., a machine on an assembly line). The controlled process 814may accept process inputs 822 (e.g., raw materials) and produce processoutputs 824 (e.g., finished products). New information 820 provided tothe controlled process 814 may result in new sensor 812 signals, whichidentify the state of the controlled process 814 and which may alsotransmitted to the controller 804.

In some implementations, at least some of the sensors 812 can alsoprovide the deception center 898 with visibility into the industrialcontrol system 800, such as for example being able to present or projectdeceptive security mechanisms into the industrial control system.Additionally, in various implementations, the sensors 812 may provide aportal through which a suspected attack on the industrial control systemcan be redirected to the deception center 898. The deception center 898and the sensors 812 may be able to communicate using network tunnels880.

The deception center 898 provides network security for the industrialcontrol system 800 by deploying security mechanisms into the industrialcontrol system 800, monitoring the industrial control system through thesecurity mechanisms, detecting and redirecting apparent threats, andanalyzing network activity resulting from the apparent threat. In someimplementations, the industrial control system 800 can include more thanone deception center 898. In some implementations, the deception centermay be located off-site, such as on the Internet.

In some implementations, the deception center 898 may interact with asecurity services provider 896 located outside the industrial controlsystem 800. The security services provider 896 may act as a central hubfor providing security to multiple sites that are part of the industrialcontrol system 800, and/or for multiple separate, possibly unrelated,industrial control systems. For example, the security services provider896 may communicate with multiple deception centers 898 that eachprovide security for a different industrial control system 800 for thesame organization. As another example, the security services provider896 may coordinate the activities of the deception center 898 and thesensors 812, such as enabling the deception center 898 and the sensors812 to connect to each other. In some implementations, the securityservices provider 896 is located outside the industrial control system800. In some implementations, the security services provider 896 iscontrolled by a different entity than the entity that controls the sitenetwork. For example, the security services provider 896 may be anoutside vendor. In some implementations, the security services provider896 is controlled by the same entity as that controls the industrialcontrol system. In some implementations, the network security systemdoes not include a security services provider 896.

The human-machine interface 806 provides operators and engineers with aninterface for controller interaction 830. Controller interaction 830 mayinclude monitoring and configuring set points and control algorithms,and adjusting and establishing parameters in the controller 804. Thehuman-machine interface 806 typically also receives information from thecontroller 804 that allows the human-machine interface 806 to displayprocess status information and historical information about theoperation of the control loop 802.

The remote diagnostics and maintenance 808 utilities are typically usedto prevent, identify, and recover from abnormal operation or failures.For diagnostics, the remote diagnostics and maintenance utilities 808may monitor the operation of each of the controller 804, sensors 812,and actuators 810. To recover after a problem, the remote diagnosticsand maintenance 808 utilities may provide recovery information andinstructions to one or more of the controller 804, sensors 812, and/oractuators 810.

A typical industrial control system contains many control loops,human-machine interfaces, and remote diagnostics and maintenance tools,built using an array of network protocols on layered networkarchitectures. In some cases, multiple control loops are nested and/orcascading, with the set point for one control loop being based onprocess variables determined by another control loop. Supervisory-levelcontrol loops and lower-level control loops typically operatecontinuously over the duration of a process, with cycle times rangingfrom milliseconds to minutes.

One type of industrial control system that may include many controlloops, human-machine interfaces, and remote diagnostics and maintenancetools is a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system.SCADA systems are used to control dispersed assets, where centralizeddata acquisition is typically as important as control of the system.SCADA systems are used in distribution systems such as, for example,water distribution and wastewater collection systems, oil and naturalgas pipelines, electrical utility transmission and distribution systems,and rail and other public transportation systems, among others. SCADAsystems typically integrate data acquisition systems with datatransmission systems and human-machine interface software to provide acentralized monitoring and control system for numerous process inputsand outputs. SCADA systems are typically designed to collect fieldinformation, transfer this information to a central computer facility,and to display the information to an operator in a graphic and/ortextual manner. Using this displayed information, the operator may, inreal time, monitor and control an entire system from a central location.In various implementations, control of any individual sub-system,operation, or task can be automatic, or can be performed by manualcommands.

FIG. 9 illustrates an example of a SCADA system 900, here used fordistributed monitoring and control. This example SCADA system 900includes a primary control center 902 and three field sites 930 a-930 c.A backup control center 904 provides redundancy in case of there is amalfunction at the primary control center 902. The primary controlcenter 902 in this example includes a control server 906—which may alsobe called a SCADA server or a Master Terminal Unit (MTU)—and a localarea network (LAN) 918. The primary control center 902 may also includea human-machine interface station 908, a data historian 910, engineeringworkstations 912, and various network equipment such as printers 914,each connected to the LAN 918.

The control server 906 typically acts as the master of the SCADA system900. The control server 906 typically includes supervisory controlsoftware that controls lower-level control devices, such as RemoteTerminal Units (RTUs) and PLCs, located at the field sites 930 a-930 c.The software may tell the system 900 what and when to monitor, whatparameter ranges are acceptable, and/or what response to initiate whenparameters are outside of acceptable values.

The control server 906 of this example may access Remote Terminal Unitsand/or PLCs at the field sites 930 a-930 c using a communicationsinfrastructure, which may include radio-based communication devices,telephone lines, cables, and/or satellites. In the illustrated example,the control server 906 is connected to a modem 916, which providescommunication with serial-based radio communication 920, such as a radioantenna. Using the radio communication 920, the control server 906 cancommunicate with field sites 930 a-930 b using radiofrequency signals922. Some field sites 930 a-930 b may have radio transceivers forcommunicating back to the control server 906.

A human-machine interface station 908 is typically a combination ofhardware and software that allows human operators to monitor the stateof processes in the SCADA system 900. The human-machine interfacestation 908 may further allow operators to modify control settings tochange a control objective, and/or manually override automatic controloperations, such as in the event of an emergency. The human-machineinterface station 908 may also allow a control engineer or operator toconfigure set points or control algorithms and parameters in acontroller, such as a Remote Terminal Unit or a PLC. The human-machineinterface station 908 may also display process status information,historical information, reports, and other information to operators,administrators, mangers, business partners, and other authorized users.The location, platform, and interface of a human-machine interfacestation 908 may vary. For example, the human-machine interface station908 may be a custom, dedicated platform in the primary control center902, a laptop on a wireless LAN, or a browser on a system connected tothe Internet.

The data historian 910 in this example is a database for logging allprocess information within the SCADA system 900. Information stored inthis database can be accessed to support analysis of the system 900, forexample for statistical process control or enterprise level planning.

The backup control center 904 may include all or most of the samecomponents that are found in the primary control center 902. In somecases, the backup control center 904 may temporarily take over forcomponents at the primary control center 902 that have failed or havebeen taken offline for maintenance. In some cases, the backup controlcenter 904 is configured to take over all operations of the primarycontrol center 902, such as when the primary control center 902experiences a complete failure (e.g., is destroyed in a naturaldisaster).

The primary control center 902 may collect and log information gatheredby the field sites 930 a-930 c and display this information using thehuman-machine interface station 908. The primary control center 902 mayalso generate actions based on detected events. The primary controlcenter 902 may, for example, poll field devices at the field sites 930a-930 c for data at defined intervals (e.g., 5 or 60 seconds), and cansend new set points to a field device as required. In addition topolling and issuing high-level commands, the primary control center 902may also watch for priority interrupts coming from the alarm systems atthe field sites 930 a-930 c.

In this example, the primary control center 902 uses point-to-pointconnections to communication with three field sites 930 a-930 c, usingradio telemetry for two communications with two of the field sites 930a-930 b. In this example, the primary control center 902 uses a widearea network (WAN) 960 to communicate with the third field site 930 c.In other implementations, the primary control center 902 may use othercommunication topologies to communicate with field sites. Othercommunication topologies include rings, stars, meshes, trees, lines orseries, and busses or multi-drops, among others. Standard andproprietary communication protocols may be used to transport informationbetween the primary control center 902 and field sites 930 a-930 c.These protocols may use telemetry techniques such as provided bytelephone lines, cables, fiber optics, and/or radiofrequencytransmissions such as broadcast, microwave, and/or satellitecommunications.

The field sites 930 a-930 c in this example perform local control ofactuators and monitor local sensors. For example, a first field site 930a may include a PLC 932. A PLC is a small industrial computer originallydesigned to perform the logic functions formerly executed by electricalhardware (such as relays, switches, and/or mechanical timers andcounters). PLCs have evolved into controllers capable of controllingcomplex processes, and are used extensively in both SCADA systems anddistributed control systems. Other controllers used at the field levelinclude process controllers and Remote Terminal Units, which may providethe same level of control as a PLC but may be designed for specificcontrol applications. In SCADA environments, PLCs are often used asfield devices because they are more economical, versatile, flexible, andconfigurable than special-purpose controllers.

The PLC 932 at a field site, such as the first field site 930 a, maycontrol local actuators 934, 936 and monitor local sensors 938, 940,942. Examples of actuators include valves 934 and pumps 936, amongothers. Examples of sensors include level sensors 938, pressure sensors940, and flow sensors 942, among others. Any of the actuators 934, 936or sensors 938, 940, 942 may be “smart” actuators or sensors, morecommonly called intelligent electronic devices (LEDs). Intelligentelectronic devices may include intelligence for acquiring data,communicating with other devices, and performing local processing andcontrol. An intelligent electronic device could combine an analog inputsensor, analog output, low-level control capabilities, a communicationsystem, and/or program memory in one device. The use of intelligentelectronic devices in SCADA systems and distributed control systems mayallow for automatic control at the local level. Intelligent electronicdevices, such as protective relays, may communicate directly with thecontrol server 906. Alternatively or additionally, a local RemoteTerminal Unit may poll intelligent electronic devices to collect data,which it may then pass to the control server 906.

Field sites 930 a-930 c are often equipped with remote access capabilitythat allows field operators to perform remote diagnostics and repairs.For example, the first remote 930 a may include a modem 916 connected tothe PLC 932. A remote access 950 site may be able to, using a dial upconnection, connect to the modem 916. The remote access 950 site mayinclude its own modem 916 for dialing into to the field site 930 a overa telephone line. At the remote access 950 site, an operator may use acomputer 952 connected to the modem 916 to perform diagnostics andrepairs on the first field site 930 a.

The example SCADA system 900 includes a second field site 930 b, whichmay be provisioned in substantially the same way as the first field site930 a, having at least a modem and a PLC or Remote Terminal thatcontrols and monitors some number of actuators and sensors.

The example SCADA system 900 also includes a third field site 930 c thatincludes a network interface card (NIC) 944 for communicating with thesystem's 900 WAN 960. In this example, the third field site 930 cincludes a Remote Terminal Unit 946 that is responsible for controllinglocal actuators 934, 936 and monitoring local sensors 938, 940, 942. ARemote Terminal Unit, also called a remote telemetry unit, is aspecial-purpose data acquisition and control unit typically designed tosupport SCADA remote stations. Remote Terminal Units may be fielddevices equipped with wireless radio interfaces to support remotesituations where wire-based communications are unavailable. In somecases, PLCs are implemented as Remote Terminal Units.

The SCADA system 900 of this example also includes a regional controlcenter 970 and a corporate enterprise network 990. The regional controlcenter 970 may provide a higher level of supervisory control. Theregional control center 970 may include at least a human-machineinterface station 908 and a control server 906 that may have supervisorycontrol over the control server 906 at the primary control center 902.The corporate enterprise network 990 typically has access, through thesystem's 900 WAN 960, to all the control centers 902, 904 and to thefield sites 930 a-930 c. The corporate enterprise network 990 mayinclude a human-machine interface station 908 so that operators canremotely maintain and troubleshoot operations.

Another type of industrial control system is the distributed controlsystem (DCS). Distributed control systems are typically used to controlproduction systems within the same geographic location for industriessuch as oil refineries, water and wastewater management, electric powergeneration plants, chemical manufacturing plants, and pharmaceuticalprocessing facilities, among others. These systems are usually processcontrol or discrete part control systems. Process control systems may beprocesses that run continuously, such as manufacturing processes forfuel or steam flow in a power plant, for petroleum production in arefinery, or for distillation in a chemical plant. Discrete part controlsystems have processes that have distinct processing steps, typicallywith a distinct start and end to each step, such as found in foodmanufacturing, electrical and mechanical parts assembly, and partsmachining. Discrete-based manufacturing industries typically conduct aseries of steps on a single item to create an end product.

A distributed control system typically uses a centralized supervisorycontrol loop to mediate a group of localized controllers that share theoverall tasks of carrying out an entire production process. Bymodularizing the production system, a distributed control system mayreduce the impact of a single fault on the overall system. A distributedcontrol system is typically interfaced with a corporate network to givebusiness operations a view of the production process.

FIG. 10 illustrates an example of a distributed control system 1000.This example distributed control system 1000 encompasses a productionfacility, including bottom-level production processes at a field level1004, supervisory control systems at a supervisory level 1002, and acorporate or enterprise layer.

At the supervisory level 1002, a control server 1006, operating as asupervisory controller, may communicate with subordinate systems via acontrol network 1018. The control server 1006 may send set points todistributed field controllers, and may request data from the distributedfield controllers. The supervisory level 1002 may include multiplecontrol servers 1006, with one acting as the primary control server andthe rest acting as redundant, back-up control servers. The supervisorylevel 1002 may also include a main human-machine interface 1008 for useby operators and engineers, a data historian 1010 for logging processinformation from the system 1000, and engineering workstations 1012.

At the field level 1004, the system 1000 may include various distributedfield controllers. In the illustrated example, the distributed controlsystem 1000 includes a machine controller 1020, a PLC 1032, a processcontroller 1040, and a single loop controller 1044. The distributedfield controllers may each control local process actuators, based oncontrol server 1006 commands and sensor feedback from local processsensors.

In this example, the machine controller 1020 drives a motion controlnetwork 1026. Using the motion control network 1026, the machinecontroller 1020 may control a number of servo drives 1022, which mayeach drive a motor. The machine controller 1020 may also drive a logiccontrol bus 1028 to communicate with various devices 1024. For example,the machine controller 1020 may use the logic control bus 1028 tocommunicate with pressure sensors, pressure regulators, and/or solenoidvalves, among other devices. One or more of the devices 1024 may be anintelligent electronic device. A human-machine interface 1008 may beattached to the machine controller 1020 to provide an operator withlocal status information about the processes under control of themachine controller 1020, and/or local control of the machine controller1020. A modem 1016 may also be attached to the machine controller 1020to provide remote access to the machine controller 1020.

The PLC 1032 in this example system 1000 uses a fieldbus 1030 tocommunicate with actuators 1034 and sensors 1036 under its control.These actuators 1034 and sensors 1036 may include, for example, directcurrent (DC) servo drives, alternating current (AC) servo drives, lighttowers, photo eyes, and/or proximity sensors, among others. Ahuman-machine interface 1008 may also be attached to the fieldbus 1030to provide operators with local status and control for the PLC 1032. Amodem 1016 may also be attached to the PLC 1032 to provide remote accessto the PLC 1032.

The process controller 1040 in this example system 1000 also uses afieldbus 1030 to communicate with actuators and sensors under itscontrol, one or more of which may be intelligent electronic devices. Theprocess controller 1040 may communicate with its fieldbus 1030 throughan input/output (I/O) server 1042. An I/O server is a control componenttypically responsible for collecting, buffering, and/or providing accessto process information from control sub-components. An I/O server may beused for interfacing with third-party control components. Actuators andsensors under control of the process controller 1040 may include, forexample, pressure regulators, pressure sensors, temperature sensors,servo valves, and/or solenoid valves, among others. The processcontroller 1040 may be connected to a modem 1016 so that a remote access1050 site may access the process controller 1040. The remote access 1050site may include a computer 1052 for use by an operator to monitor andcontrol the process controller 1040. The computer 1052 may be connectedto a local modem 1016 for dialing in to the modem 1016 connected to theprocess controller 1040.

The illustrated example system 1000 also includes a single loopcontroller 1044. In this example, the single loop controller 1044interfaces with actuators 1034 and sensors 1036 with point-to-pointconnections, instead of a fieldbus. Point-to-point connections require adedicated connection for each actuator 1034 and each sensor 1036.Fieldbus networks, in contrast, do not need point-to-point connectionsbetween a controller and individual field sensors and actuators. In someimplementations, a fieldbus allows greater functionality beyond control,including field device diagnostics. A fieldbus can accomplish controlalgorithms within the fieldbus, thereby avoiding signal routing back toa PLC for every control operation. Standard industrial communicationprotocols are often used on control networks and fieldbus networks.

The single loop controller 1044 in this example is also connected to amodem 1016, for remote access to the single loop controller.

In addition to the supervisory level 1002 and field level 1004 controlloops, the distributed control system 1000 may also include intermediatelevels of control. For example, in the case of a distributed controlsystem controlling a discrete part manufacturing facility, there couldbe an intermediate level supervisor for each cell within the plant. Thisintermediate level supervisor could encompass a manufacturing cellcontaining a machine controller that processes a part, and a robotcontroller that handles raw stock and final products. Additionally, thedistributed control system could include several of these cells thatmanage field-level controllers under the main distributed control systemsupervisory control loop.

In various implementations, the distributed control system may include acorporate or enterprise layer, where an enterprise network 1080 mayconnect to the example production facility. The enterprise network 1080may be, for example, located at a corporate office co-located with thefacility, and connected to the control network 1018 in the supervisorylevel 1002. The enterprise network 1080 may provide engineers andmanagers with control and visibility into the facility. The enterprisenetwork 1080 may further include Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES)1092, control systems for managing and monitoring work-in-process on afactory floor. An MES can track manufacturing information in real time,receiving up-to-the-minute data from robots, machine monitors andemployees. The enterprise network 1080 may also include ManagementInformation Systems (MIS) 1094, software and hardware applications thatimplement, for example, decision support systems, resource and peoplemanagement applications, project management, and database retrievalapplications, as well as basic business functions such as order entryand accounting. The enterprise network 1080 may further includeEnterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems 1096, business processmanagement software that allows an organization to use a system ofintegrated applications to manage the business and automate many backoffice functions related to technology, services, and human resources.

The enterprise network 1080 may further be connected to a WAN 1060.Through the WAN 1060, the enterprise network 1080 may connect to adistributed plant 1098, which may include control loops and supervisoryfunctions similar to the illustrated facility, but which may be at adifferent geographic location. The WAN 1060 may also connect theenterprise network to the outside world 1090, that is, to the Internetand/or various private and public networks. In some cases, the WAN 1060may itself include the Internet, so that the enterprise network 1080accesses the distributed plant 1098 over the Internet.

As described above, SCADA systems and distributed control systems useProgrammable Logic Controllers (PLCs) as the control components of anoverall hierarchical system. PLCs can provide local management ofprocesses through feedback control, as described above. In a SCADAimplementation, a PLC can provide the same functionality as a RemoteTerminal Unit. When used in a distributed control system, PLCs can beimplemented as local controllers within a supervisory scheme. PLCs canhave user-programmable memory for storing instructions, where theinstructions implement specific functions such as I/O control, logic,timing, counting, proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control,communication, arithmetic, and data and file processing.

FIG. 11 illustrates an example of a PLC 1132 implemented in amanufacturing control process. The PLC 1132 in this example monitors andcontrols various devices over fieldbus network 1130. The PLC 1132 may beconnected to a LAN 1118. An engineering workstation 1112 may also beconnected to the LAN 1118, and may include a programming interface thatprovides access to the PLC 1132. A data historian 1110 on the LAN 1118may store data produced by the PLC 1132.

The PLC 1132 in this example may control a number of devices attached toits fieldbus network 1130. These devices may include actuators, such asa DC servo drive 1122, an AC drive 1124, a variable frequency drive1134, and/or a light tower 1138. The PLC 1132 may also monitor sensorsconnected to the fieldbus network 1130, such as proximity sensors 1136,and/or a photo eye 1142. A human-machine interface 1108 may also beconnected to the fieldbus network 1130, and may provide local monitoringand control of the PLC 1132.

Most industrial control systems were developed years ago, long beforepublic and private networks, desktop computing, or the Internet were acommon part of business operations. These well-established industrialcontrol systems were designed to meet performance, reliability, safety,and flexibility requirements. In most cases, they were physicallyisolated from outside networks and based on proprietary hardware,software, and communication protocols that included basic errordetection and correction capabilities, but lacked secure communicationcapabilities. While there was concern for reliability, maintainability,and availability when addressing statistical performance and failure,the need for cyber security measures within these systems was notanticipated. At the time, security for industrial control systems meanphysically securing access to the network and the consoles thatcontrolled the systems.

Internet-based technologies have since become part of modern industrialcontrol systems. Widely available, low-cost IP devices have replacedproprietary solutions, which increases the possibility of cyber securityvulnerabilities and incidents. Industrial control systems have adoptedInternet-based solutions to promote corporate connectivity and remoteaccess capabilities, and are being designed and implemented usingindustry standard computers, operating systems (OS) and networkprotocols. As a result, these systems may to resemble computer networks.This integration supports new networking capabilities, but provides lessisolation for industrial control systems from the outside world thanpredecessor systems. Networked industrial control systems may be exposedto similar threats as are seen in computer networks, and an increasedlikelihood that an industrial control system can be compromised.

Industrial control system vendors have begun to open up theirproprietary protocols and publish their protocol specifications toenable third-party manufacturers to build compatible accessories.Organizations are also transitioning from proprietary systems to lessexpensive, standardized technologies such as Microsoft Windows andUnix-like operating systems as well as common networking protocols suchas Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) to reducecosts and improve performance. Another standard contributing to thisevolution of open systems is Open Platform Communications (OPC), aprotocol that enables interaction between control systems and PC-basedapplication programs. The transition to using these open protocolstandards provides economic and technical benefits, but also increasesthe susceptibility of industrial control systems to cyber incidents.These standardized protocols and technologies have commonly knownvulnerabilities, which are susceptible to sophisticated and effectiveexploitation tools that are widely available and relatively easy to use.

Industrial control systems and corporate networking systems are ofteninterconnected as a result of several changes in information managementpractices, operational, and business needs. The demand for remote accesshas encouraged many organizations to establish connections to theindustrial control system that enable of industrial control systemsengineers and support personnel to monitor and control the system frompoints outside the control network. Many organizations have also addedconnections between corporate networks and industrial control systemsnetworks to allow the organization's decision makers to obtain access tocritical data about the status of their operational systems and to sendinstructions for the manufacture or distribution of product.

In early implementations this might have been done with customapplications software or via an OPC server/gateway, but, in the past tenyears this has been accomplished with TCP/IP networking and standardizedIP applications like File Transfer Protocol (FTP) or Extensible MarkupLanguage (XML) data exchanges. Often, these connections were implementedwithout a full understanding of the corresponding security risks. Inaddition, corporate networks are often connected to strategic partnernetworks and to the Internet. Control systems also make more use of WANsand the Internet to transmit data to their remote or local stations andindividual devices. This integration of control system networks withpublic and corporate networks increases the accessibility of controlsystem vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can expose all levels ofthe industrial control system network architecture to complexity-inducederror, adversaries and a variety of cyber threats, including worms andother malware.

Many industrial control system vendors have delivered systems withdial-up modems that provide remote access to ease the burdens ofmaintenance for the technical field support personnel. Remote access canbe accomplished, for example, using a telephone number, and sometimes anaccess control credential (e.g., valid ID, and/or a password). Remoteaccess may provide support staff with administrative-level access to asystem. Adversaries with war dialers—simple personal computer programsthat dial consecutive phone numbers looking for modems—and passwordcracking software could gain access to systems through these remoteaccess capabilities. Passwords used for remote access are often commonto all implementations of a particular vendor's systems and may have notbeen changed by the end user. These types of connections can leave asystem highly vulnerable because people entering systems throughvendor-installed modems are may be granted high levels of system access.

Organizations often inadvertently leave access links such as dial-upmodems open for remote diagnostics, maintenance, and monitoring. Also,control systems increasingly utilize wireless communications systems,which can be vulnerable. Access links not protected with authenticationand/or encryption have the increased risk of adversaries using theseunsecured connections to access remotely controlled systems. This couldlead to an adversary compromising the integrity of the data in transitas well as the availability of the system, both of which can result inan impact to public and plant safety. Data encryption may be a solution,but may not be the appropriate solution in all cases.

Many of the interconnections between corporate networks and industrialcontrol systems require the integration of systems with differentcommunications standards. The result is often an infrastructure that isengineered to move data successfully between two unique systems. Becauseof the complexity of integrating disparate systems, control engineersoften fail to address the added burden of accounting for security risks.Control engineers may have little training in security and often networksecurity personnel are not involved in security design. As a result,access controls designed to protect control systems from unauthorizedaccess through corporate networks may be minimal. Protocols, such asTCP/IP and others have characteristics that often go unchecked, and thismay counter any security that can be done at the network or theapplication levels.

Public information regarding industrial control system design,maintenance, interconnection, and communication may be readily availableover the Internet to support competition in product choices as well asto enable the use of open standards. Industrial control system vendorsalso sell toolkits to help develop software that implements the variousstandards used in industrial control system environments. There are alsomany former employees, vendors, contractors, and other end users of thesame industrial control system equipment worldwide who have insideknowledge about the operation of control systems and processes.

Information and resources are available to potential adversaries andintruders of all calibers around the world. With the availableinformation, it is quite possible for an individual with very littleknowledge of control systems to gain unauthorized access to a controlsystem with the use of automated attack and data mining tools and afactory-set default password. Many times, these default passwords arenever changed.

IV. Threat Engagement and Deception Escalation

In various implementations, the systems and methods discussed above canbe used to implement a network deception system that can automaticallyand dynamically escalate to engage a network threat. By keeping anetwork threat engaged, the system can obtain intelligence about thethreat, which can be used to defend networks against the same or asimilar threat.

FIG. 12 illustrates an example of a network deception system 1200. Invarious implementations, the illustrated network deception system 1200can include three types of deception mechanisms: a super-low deceptionengine 1226, low-interaction deceptions 1228 a-1228 d, andhigh-interaction deceptions 1236 a-1236 b. Because of the super-lowdeception engine's association with multiple MAC and IP address pairs,the super-low deception engine 1226 can also be referred to as anaddress deception engine. Similarly, super-low-interaction deceptions(also referred to herein as super-low deceptions) can also be referredto as address deceptions. Low interaction deceptions andhigh-interaction deceptions may also be referred to as interactivedeception mechanism. The example network deception system 1200 alsoincludes an address table 1230 that stores MAC 1232 and IP 1234addresses.

In the illustrated example, the deception mechanisms and the addresstable 1230 are implemented by a network emulator 1220. The networkemulator 1220 can have multiple connections 1224 to a site network 1204.The site network 1204 is network installed at a customer site, such as abusiness, an office complex, an educational institution, or a privatehome. The site network 1204 may all or in part be located in the“cloud;” that is, some or all of the network may be provided by anetwork services provider. Multiple connections 1224 can connect thenetwork emulator 1220 to the site network 1204 over multiple variouscommunication mediums (e.g., cables, radio signals, optical cables,etc.). Alternatively or additionally, one or more of the multipleconnections 1224 can be individual network conversations carried overone communication medium. Examples of network conversations includeTransmission Control Protocol (TCP) sockets and exchanges of UserDatagram Protocol (UDP) datagrams, among others.

The network emulator 1220 can be configured to emulate one or morenetwork devices. Network devices can include network hardware, such asrouters, switches, hubs, repeaters, and gateway devices, among others.Network devices can also include computing systems connected to thenetwork, such as servers, desktop computers, laptop computers, netbooks,tablet computers, personal digital assistants, and smart phones, amongothers. Network devices can also include other electronic devices withnetwork interfaces, such as televisions, gaming devices, thermostats,refrigerators, and so on. Network devices can also be virtual, such asvirtual machines. In various implementations, the network emulator 1220can be implemented by one or more network devices. In someimplementations, the network emulator 1220 can be implemented by anetwork device dedicated to providing security services for the sitenetwork 1204.

In various implementations, deception mechanisms in the network emulator1220 can each represent one or more emulated network devices. To aid thedeceptions mechanisms in convincingly representing a network device,each deception mechanism can be assigned a realistic looking MAC address1232. A MAC address, which may also be referred to as a physicaladdress, is a unique identifier assigned to network interface of anetwork device. MAC addresses 1232 assigned to the deception mechanismscan be, for example, given recognizable Organizationally UniqueIdentifiers (OUIs), rather than fully random values, to increase thebelievability of the deception mechanisms. MAC addresses 1232 for thedeception mechanisms can be programmed into the address table 1230 by anetwork administrator. Alternatively or additionally, MAC addresses 1232may be provided by a configuration file, which can be provided by anetwork administrator and/or which may be downloaded from a securityservices provider on the Internet. Alternatively or additionally, anautomated system within the network deception system 1200 can examinethe site network 1204, and develop a profile describing the type andnumber of devices in the site network 1204. The network deception system1200 can then generate MAC addresses 1232 based on the profile.

The network emulator 1220 can associate each MAC address 1232 with an IPaddress 1234, and store the associated IP addresses 1234 with their MACaddresses 1232 in the address table 1230. IP addresses are numericalstrings that identify a network device on a network. IP addresses can beused in some contexts within network communications, while MAC addressescan be used in others. For example, MAC addresses are often not usedonce a packet leaves a local subnet. Furthermore, IP addresses, unlikeMAC addresses, can be transient. For example, each time a laptopcomputer or handheld device connects to the same network, it may beassigned a different IP address.

Dynamically assigned IP addresses are typically managed and assigned bya server running the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP). Thenetwork emulator 1220 may request IP addresses 1234 from a DHCP serveroperating in the site network 1204, and store these IP addresses 1234 inthe address table 1230. By requesting IP addresses 1234 from the DHCPserver in the site network 1204, the network emulator 1220 is able toobtain IP addresses 1234 that are within the domain of the site network1204. Static IP addresses can also be assigned to the network emulator1220.

Additionally, the site network 1204 can have multiple broadcast domains.A broadcast domain is a logical division within a network, in which allthe nodes can reach each other using broadcast packets. As an example,quite often all the network devices connected to the same repeater orswitch are within the same broadcast domain. As a further example,routers frequently form the boundaries of a broadcast domain. When thesite network 1204 has multiple broadcast domains, in variousimplementations, the network emulator 1220 can have deception mechanismsfor each broadcast domain. For example, in the example of FIG. 12, thenetwork emulator 1220 has obtained IP addresses in three broadcastdomains: 10.10.1, 10.10.2, and 10.10.3.

In various implementations, the network emulator 1220 can alsoperiodically request new IP addresses 1234, to mimic network devicesdisconnecting and reconnecting to the site network 1204. IP addresses1234 can be refreshed intelligently. For example, the IP address 1234for a MAC address 1232 that can be associated with a server may not bechanged very frequently, if at all, since servers may be taken offlinevery infrequently, or may be assigned fixed IP addresses. As anotherexample, a MAC address 1232 that is associated with a network interfacecard typically found in a laptop computer can be changed every morning,to simulate the laptop's owner arriving at work.

In various implementations, the address table 1230 can store the MACaddresses 1232 and associated IP addresses 1234. The address table 1230can also store assignments 1238, which list the deception mechanism thateach MAC 1232 and IP 1234 address is currently assigned to. Generally,as discussed further below, the assignments 1238 can be changeddynamically, in reaction to interactions with the deception mechanisms.Initially, in some implementations, all the MAC 1232 and IP 1234addresses can be assigned to the super-low deception engine 1226, whichis the lightest-weight deception. In some implementations, the networkemulator 1220 can include a static high-interaction deception(illustrated in the example of FIG. 12 by the second high-interactiondeception 1236 b), where “static” means that this high-interactiondeception 1236 b is available for interacting with network traffic evenbefore a suspect interaction occurs. This high-interaction deception1236 b can thus also have a MAC 1232 and IP 1234 address assigned to it.

Because these addresses 1232, 1234 were generated for decoy networkdevices, network traffic should ordinarily not be addressed to theseaddresses 1232, 1234. Not all network traffic for these addresses 1232,1234, however, is suspect. For example, as discussed below, networktraffic that appears to be for a port scan may not be, by itself, anattack on the site network. For this and other examples, the networkemulator 1220 can intelligently determine when received network trafficwarrants escalating the deception. Such intelligence can includealgorithms based on observations of network traffic behavior.Alternatively or additionally, the intelligence can include observationof the site network 1204 and, for example, data science-based algorithmsthat relate the activity seen in the site network 1204 to possibleattacks. Once the network deception system 1200 identifies someparticular network traffic received by a deception mechanism as suspect,the network deception system 1200 can initiate a higher level deceptionto receive the suspect network traffic.

The lowest level deception is a super-low deception. The super-lowdeception engine 1226 is deception mechanism that can emulate one ormore super-low deceptions. In various implementations, a super-lowdeception includes at least MAC address 1232 and an associated IPaddress 1234. The super-low deception engine 1226 can have a local tableor memory in which it stores address to which it may respond. Thenetwork deception system 1200 can assign one or more of the MAC 1232 andIP 1234 address pairs to the super-low deception engine 1226 by addingthe MAC 1232 and IP 1234 addresses to the super-low deception engine'slocal table.

In various implementations, the super-low deception engine 1226 canrespond to queries for MAC and/or IP address information. For example,the super-low deception engine 1226 can implement an address resolutionprotocol (ARP). An address resolution protocol can enable the super-lowdeception engine 1226 to respond to queries, where the queries includean IP address. In this example, when the super-low deception engine 1226is queried for an IP address that is in the super-low deception engine'slocal table, the super-low deception engine 1226 may respond with a MACaddress that is associated with the IP address. Other examples ofprotocols that can be implemented by the super-low deception engine 1226include Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), Network BasicInput/Output System (NetBIOS), finger, and ping, among others.

Address queries may occur, for example, when an attacker is mapping anetwork and looking for possible points to attack. For example, anattacker can generate queries for all IP addresses in a broadcast domain(e.g., assuming a 32-bit netmask, 10.10.1.0, 10.10.1.1, 10.10.1.2, andso on until 10.10.1.254). Devices that respond not only tell theattacker that the device exists, but may also provide the attacker withthe device's MAC address. Once the attacker has a device's MAC address,the attacker may be able to attack the device by directing networktraffic at the device, using the device's MAC address as the destinationaddress.

In various implementations, the super-low deception engine 1226 can alsominimally respond to other types of broadcast traffic and/or multicastor unicast traffic directed to one of the IP address that is currentlyassigned to the super-low deception engine 1226. For example, thesuper-low deception engine 1226 can be configured to respond to someand/or some other system can also respond to some packets associatedwith TCP, UDP, and ICMP scans. In various implementations, the super-lowdeception engine 1226 can only respond to network packets that do notrequire a persistent connection, and/or that require a response that isless complicated than acknowledging the presence of a device on thenetwork.

In some implementations, the super-low deception engine 1226 and/or someother component in the network deception system 1200 can be configuredto transmit network traffic, where the network traffic is configured toappear to be coming from an IP address assigned to the super-lowdeception engine 1226. Network traffic generation can make the super-lowdeceptions more realistically appear to be real network devices.

When the network emulator 1220 receives suspect network trafficaddressed to a super-low deception that may require a more complexreply, in various implementations, the network emulator 1220 caninitiate a low-interaction deception 1228 a-1228 d, to respond to thenetwork traffic. Network traffic that can initiate an escalation to alow-interaction deception includes, for example, certain TCP packets andUDP packets, such as packets for establishing telnet, File TransferProtocol (FTP), Secure SHell (SSH), Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) oranother type of connection.

In various implementations, low-interaction deceptions 1228 a-1228 d areemulated systems that can configured to receive network traffic formultiple MAC 1232 and IP 1234 address pairs. The low-interactiondeceptions 1228 a-1228 d can have a basic installation of an operatingsystem, which can have a particular version number but may not accountfor variations of the operating system due to patches, incrementalupdates, custom installations, or other factors. In some cases, thelow-interaction deceptions 1228 a-1228 d can also be configured with afull suite of services that may be offered by real system with the sameoperating system. In most implementations, the services are fullyfunctional processes, and respond as would the same services running ona real network device. In some implementations, the services may beemulated, and respond in an automated and/or pre-configured fashion. Insome implementations, the low-interaction deceptions 1228 a-1228 d canalso be configured with applications, executing processes, data, and/ordatabases. In these implementations, the executing processes can beemulating an application, and/or the processes can be actual executinginstances of applications. In some implementations, the low-interactiondeceptions 1228 a-1228 d can also emulate particular hardware, such as aprocessor type or version, motherboard architecture, and/or attachedperipheral devices. In some implementations the low-interactiondeceptions 1228 a-1228 d can be implemented using one or more computers,servers, blade computers, or some other type of computing systemhardware. In some implementations, the low-interaction deceptions 1228a-1228 d can be implemented using virtual machines.

In various implementations, the network emulator 1220 can includemultiple low-interaction deceptions 1228 a-1228 d, with eachlow-interaction deception 1228 a-1228 d running a different operatingsystem. The network devices in the site network 1204 can be running avariety of different operating systems, such as Red Hat Linux, UbuntuLinux, Windows 7, Windows 10, OSX, and so on. To mimic network devicesthat may be found in the site network 1204, the network emulator 1220can have low-interaction deceptions 1228 a-1228 d for some or all of theoperating systems in use in the site network 1204. In this way, thelow-interaction deceptions 1228 a-1228 d can resemble a typical systemthat can be found in the site network 1204.

The site network 1204, however, may have multiple variations of the sameoperating system. For example, various network devices may have the sameversion of Linux but have different patch levels or installed packages.In most implementations, the network deception system 1200 may not havea low-interaction deception 1228 a-1228 d for each variation of eachoperating system, since to do so could potentially require a very largenumber of low-interaction deceptions 1228 a-1228 d. Instead, onelow-interaction deception 1228 a-1228 d, executing one version of anoperation system, can emulate multiple network devices by being able toreceive network traffic addresses to different addresses, where each ofthese network devices appear to have at least the same version of theoperating system.

In various implementations, the network emulator 1220 can keep thelow-interaction deceptions 1228 a-1228 d on standby, so that alow-interaction deception 1228 a-1228 b is available as soon as suspectnetwork traffic is received for any of the MAC 1232 or IP 1234 addressesbeing used for super-low deceptions. Alternatively or additionally, theconfiguration for a low-interaction deception 1228 a-1228 d can be keptready, and a low-interaction deceptions 1228 a-1228 d can be launchedwhen it is needed.

Should a threat source connect to a low-interaction deception 1228a-1228 d, however, the threat source may be able to determine that thethreat source has connected to a decoy. For example, the threat sourcemay notice that many network devices (that is, the network devicesemulated by one low-interaction deception 1228 a-1228 d) have identicaloperating systems and services. This may indicate to the threat sourcethat the threat source has found a decoy. The network deception system1200 thus, in most cases, will not allow connections to low-interactiondeceptions 1228 a-1228 d to complete. The network deception system 1200can, instead, redirect the connections to a high-interaction deception1236 a-1236 b.

The high-interaction deceptions 1236 a-1236 b are systems configured torespond to network traffic for a specific MAC 1232 and IP 1234addresses. In some implementations, the high-interaction deceptions 1236a-1236 b can be implemented using one or more physical computers,servers, or other computing system hardware. In some implementations, aparticular hardware and/or software configuration for a high-interactiondeception 1236 a-1236 b can be emulated using physical hardware. In someimplementations, configuring a high-interaction deception to resemble aparticle hardware and software configuration (e.g., a Macbook) can besimplified by using the actual hardware (e.g., a Macbook canincorporated into the network deception system). In someimplementations, the high-interaction deceptions 1236 a-1236 b may beimplemented using virtual machines.

In various implementations, the high-interaction deceptions 1236 a-1236b can execute a specific installation of an operating system, includingpatches, packages, and other variations of the operating system that anetwork device in the site network 1204 may have. The specificconfiguration of the operating system may be based on a real networkdevice in the site network 1204. Alternatively or additionally, theconfiguration of the operating system may be based on randomized list ofavailable options. Generally, as discussed below, a high-interactiondeception 1236 a-1236 b can be configured with the same basic operationsystem that is executing on a low-interaction deception 1228 a-1228 d,so that, when communications from a threat source are transferred to thehigh-interaction deception 1236 a-1236 b, the threat source does not seea difference. The operating systems on the high-interaction deceptions1236 a-1236 b can otherwise have variations to enhance the believabilityof the high-interaction deception 1236 a-1236 b.

The high-interaction deceptions 1236 a-1236 b can further includeapplications, data, desktop configuration, desktop icons and short cuts,and/or log files, any of which can be generated so that thehigh-interaction deception 1236 a-1236 b resembles a system that isactively in use. The applications, data, desktop configuration, etc. canbe copied from actual systems in a site network, and/or can be based andrandomized data sets. As discussed further below, the high-interactiondeceptions 1236 a-1236 b can also be configured with software and/ordata that appears attractive, and/or misinformation that can misdirectand/or confuse a threat source.

In some implementations, one or more high-interaction deceptions 1236a-1236 b can be kept on standby. Initiating a standby high-interactiondeceptions 1236 a-1236 b for use can involve booting and configuring anoperating system. In some implementations, a standby high-interactiondeception 1236 a-1236 b may already have an operating system running,and initiating the high-interaction deception 1236 a-1236 b onlyrequires configuring the operating system. In various implementations,initiating a high-interaction deception 1236 a-1236 b can also includestarting various services that may be offered by a computing systemrunning a particular operating system. In some implementations, ahigh-interaction deception 1236 a-1236 b can also be initiated withdata, such as various log files that can typically be generated when anetwork device is in use. Pre-initializing the high-interactiondeception 1236 a-1236 b can help the high-interaction deception 1236a-1236 b look like it has been an active system, rather than a systemthat has just been started.

Once an attack on the site network 1204 has, for one reason or another,ended, a high-interaction deception 1236 a-1236 b used to engage theattacker can be decommissioned, and the MAC 1232 and IP 1234 addressesthe high-interaction deception 1236 a-1236 b was using can be reassignedto the super-low deception engine 1226 or one of the low-interactiondeceptions 1228 a-1228 d. Processing resources used by thehigh-interaction deception 1236 a-1236 b can thus be freed for otheruses.

In some implementations, the network emulator 1220 can include a statichigh-interaction deception 1236 b. The static high-interaction deception1236 b can be used, for example, to emulate a server that is alwaysavailable on the site network 1204. For example, the statichigh-interaction deception 1236 b can be configured as a database serveror a shared network resource (sometimes referred to as a network share).To entice attack, the static high-interaction deception 1236 b can haveopen ports and/or data that appears valuable. A static high-interactiondeception 1236 b can be available at any time, and be assigned a fixedMAC address 1232. Interaction with this MAC address 1232 (or anassociated IP address 1234) can escalate from the super-low deceptionengine 1226 directly to the static high-interaction deception 1236 b,without making use of a low-interaction deception 1228 a-1228 ddeception.

In some implementations, an alternate method to implementlow-interaction and high-interaction deceptions is to use a networkaddress translation (NAT) mechanism. Network address translation enablesa network device to translate network addresses to different networkaddresses. For example, a network address translation mechanism canpresent one or more IP addresses 1234, and associated MAC addresses1232, from the address table 1230 to the site network 1204, while otherMAC and/or IP addresses are used by the high-interaction deceptions 1236a-1236 b running in the network emulator 1220. Furthermore, the networkaddress translation mechanism can present many addresses to the sitenetwork 1204, and map those many addresses to just a fewhigh-interaction deceptions 1236 a-1236 b. A network address translationmechanism thus enables the network emulator 1220 to emulate many decoysystems without requiring a high-interaction deception 1236 a-1236 b foreach decoy.

Once a possible attacker attempts to access an address presented by thenetwork address translation mechanism, however, the attacker may be ableto discover that the address is only a deception. For example, shouldthe attacker log in to the device represented by a MAC 1232 and IP 1234address combination, the attacker would be logged into ahigh-interaction deception 1236 a-1236 b running behind the networkaddress translation. The high-interaction deception 1236 a-1236 b couldlikely have a different IP and/or MAC address than was presented to theattacker. The attacker may thus discover that he has been deceived, andstop his attack. A network address translation mechanism may thus serveto divert and distract an attacker, but the low-interaction andhigh-interaction deceptions described above may be more effective forkeeping the attacker engaged.

Keeping a threat source engaged may serve to keep the threat away fromlegitimate and valuable assets in a network. Keeping a threat sourceengaged can also provide valuable threat intelligence, possiblyincluding identification of a vulnerability the threat source is seekingto exploit, the threat source's tactics, and maybe even identificationof the threat source. FIGS. 13A-13C illustrate an example of keeping athreat source engaged through escalation of the deceptions andreassignment of MAC and IP addresses. The example illustrates a networkdeception system 1300 with various configurations of deceptionsmechanisms. In various implementations, the deception mechanisms can beimplemented using a network emulator, as discussed above.

The network deceptions system 1300 can include an address table 1330 forstoring MAC addresses 1332 and IP addresses 1334 associated with each ofthe MAC addresses 1332. The MAC addresses 1332 can be configured by anetwork administrator or an automated process. The IP addresses 1334 canbe obtained, for example, from a DHCP server running in a site network.The address table 1330 can also store assignments 1338 for each MAC 1332and IP 1334 pair, which indicate the deception mechanism to which theaddress pair is assigned.

FIG. 13A illustrates an example configuration of network deceptionsystem 1300, where only address-based deception mechanisms are active.In the illustrated example, the super-low deception mechanisms arehosted by a super-low deception engine 1326. The super-low deceptionengine 1326 can be configured with some or all of the MAC 1332 and IP1334 addresses in the address table 1330. The super-low deception engine1326 can respond to some packets from a site network, such as queriesfor address information. For example, the super-low deception engine1326 can implement an address resolution protocol, and respond to IPaddress queries with the MAC address that is associated with the queriedIP address.

In the illustrated example, the system 1300 also has a low-interactiondeception 1328 and a high-interaction deception 1336 on standby. Thelow-interaction deception 1328 and the high-interaction deception 1336may be running with minimal functionality. Alternatively oradditionally, these deception mechanism may not be booted, or may bepartially booted. The system 1300 may further have a partialconfiguration (e.g., an operating system, services, applications, and/ordata) prepared for these deception mechanisms.

In some implementations, the network deception system 1300 can also haveone or more a low-interaction deceptions 1328 on standby. Standbyindicates that the low-interaction deception 1328 and thehigh-interaction deception 1336 are available, but are idle. Thelow-interaction deception 1328 may have on operating system running, ormay be ready to launch an operating system at any moment. When thelow-interaction deception 1328 has an operating system running, it mayalso have services running, where the services are idle and waiting fornetwork traffic. In some implementations, the low-interaction deception1328 may be in “sleep” or “hibernate” mode, or some similar mode fromwhich the low-interaction deception 1328 can be quickly woken. In mostcases, a low-interaction deception 1328 that is on standby will not haveany MAC 1332 or IP 1334 addresses assigned to it, since thelow-interaction deception 1328 is not expecting network traffic.

Similarly, the high-interaction deception 1336 may be running or may beready to launch at a moment's notice. In various implementations, thesystem 1300 can have a configuration prepared for the high-interactiondeception 1336. The configuration can include configuration thehigh-interaction deception 1336 with a version of the operating systemthat is configured for the low-interaction deception 1328, so that thelow-interaction deception 1328 and the high-interaction deception 1336can appear to be the same network device. While the high-interactiondeception 1336 is idle, in most cases it will not have an MAC 1332 or IP1334 address assigned to it.

Alternatively or additionally, the configuration for thehigh-interaction deception 1336 can be taken from a snapshot of eitheran actual network device or an earlier iteration of a high-interactiondeception. A snapshot can include information such as data present on anetwork device, running processes, log files, logged in user accounts,contents of memory and/or disk, and so on, as of the time at which thesnapshot was taken. Using a snapshot from an actual network device (ordrawing from snapshots from multiple actual network devices) can makethe high-interaction deception 1336 appear authentic and “lived in,”meaning in active use. A snapshot of an earlier iteration of thehigh-interaction deception can have been taken when the high-interactiondeception 1336 was previously engaged. Using such a snapshot toconfiguring the high-interaction deception can make the high-interactiondeception 1336 appear to be the same system with which a threat sourcewas previously engaged. A high-interaction deception 1336 that can pickup where a previous high-interaction deception left off can be helpfulfor threats that persists for long periods of time (e.g., days, weeks,or months), such as Advance Persistent Threats (APTs). The snapshot usedto configure the high-interaction deception 1336 can be based oninformation that can be gleaned about a threat source. For example, whena previously identified threat source re-engages with the networkdeception system, the high-interaction deception 1336 can be configuredusing a snapshot taken from the previous engagement.

In the illustrated example, all of the MAC 1332 and IP 1334 addressesare assigned 1338 to the super-low deception engine 1326, due to noother deception mechanisms being presently active. This configurationcan reflect, for example, the case where the system is not presentlyengaged with an active threat.

In the early stages of an attack, a threat source may probe a network tofind vulnerabilities and/or valuable data. Probing the network caninclude looking for address information. For example, the threat sourcemay attempt to identify which IP addresses 1334 are presently in use inthe site network. Alternatively or additionally, the threat source maybe looking for particular MAC addresses 1332, which can identifyparticular types of network devices. The threat source may subsequentlyuse this information to identify suitable targets for infiltrating. Inthese examples, because the threat source's communications 1344 arelimited to queries for address information, the network deception system1300 can receive these communications 1344 using the super-low deceptionengine 1326.

FIG. 13B illustrates an example of escalation from a super-low deceptionto a low-interaction deception 1328. As discussed with respect to FIG.13A, the MAC 1332 and IP 1334 addresses being used by the networkdeception system 1300 may initially be assigned to the super-lowdeception engine 1326. The super-low deception engine 1326 can respondto queries for network address information. These queries may can leadto the network deception system 1300 receiving communications 1344 thatuse a specific MAC and/or IP address combination 1346 as a destinationaddress. In various implementations, the network deception system 1300executes escalation from a super-low deception to the low-interactiondeception 1328 automatically and without need for human assistance.

As illustrated in FIG. 13B, to respond to more complex networkcommunications 1344, the network deception system 1300 can initiate alow-interaction deception 1328. In various implementations, initiating alow-interaction deception 1328 can include de-assigning the MAC addressand IP address combination 1346 being targeted by the communicationsfrom the super-low deception engine 1326, and reassigning the MACaddress and IP address combination 1346 to the low-interaction deception1328. De-assigning the MAC and IP address combination 1346 from thesuper-low deception engine 1326 can include removing the MAC and IPaddress combination 1346 from the super-low deception engine's localtable or memory. Assigning the MAC and IP address combination 1346 tothe low-interaction deception 1328 can involve, for example, assigningthe MAC and IP address combination 1346 to the low-interactiondeception's network interface. The address table 1330 can be updated toreflect the updated assignment 1338. As noted above, the low-interactiondeception 1328 may be on standby, that is, running in a low-power oridle mode, and thus may only need to be woken upon initiation.Alternatively, the low-interaction deception 1328 can be booted uponinitiation. In some implementations, initiating the low-interactiondeception 1328 can also include initializing an operating system and/orstarting services and/or making various ports available for connections,as discussed further below.

Once the low-interaction deception 1328 has been initiated,communications 1344 from the threat source can be directed to thelow-interaction deception 1328. The low-interaction deception 1328 cansubsequently respond to these communications 1344.

In various implementations, the low-interaction deception 1328 can beconfigured to receive network traffic for multiple MAC and IP addresspairs. For example, additional MAC 1332 and IP 1334 addresses can beassigned to a network interface (which may be a virtual networkinterface) of the same low-interaction deception 1328. In this way, thelow-interaction deception 1328 can emulate multiple systems. Each ofthese systems would appear to have a similar operating system andsimilar services.

The low-interaction deception 1328 can be configured to respond tonetwork traffic, but the network deception system 1300 may determinethat some of the network traffic is suspicious. For example, aconnection attempt may be suspicious, and may require escalating thedeception. Not all connection attempts, however, are necessarilysuspect. Some network traffic, such as broadcast packets and port scans,may be from legitimate sources in a site network, or may not have aharmful effect. Some network traffic may be suspicious, but by itselfnot cause any harm. Port scanners, for example, are one tool used byhackers to identify ports on a network device, and to find one that maybe vulnerable to an attack. A port scan, however, does not by itselfprovide the hacker with access to a network device.

The network deception system 1300 thus can include intelligent systemsfor determining whether incoming network traffic is associated with anetwork threat, or is probably harmless. For example, the networkdeception system 1300 can use a behavior of the network traffic toidentify suspect network traffic. For example, the packets associatedwith a port scan may arrive very rapidly. In an actual attack, there maybe delays between the packets, either because a malicious systemattempting to make a connection is watching for a particular response,or because the packets are being initiated by a human being. As anotherexample, when a rapid series of packets arrive for different destinationaddress, and the packets all have the same source addresses, it ispossible that the packets are for a port scan, and thus may not requireescalating the deception.

Alternatively or additionally, the network deception system 1300 canreceive information about the site network, and can apply variousalgorithms, such as data science algorithms, to determine whether someparticular network traffic is suspicious. For example, a particularnetwork device in the site network may be behaving suspiciously. Thenetwork device can have made a number of connections to a number ofInternet sites that are normally not accessed from the site network.Should this network device attempt to connect to any of the MAC 1332 orIP 1334 addresses being used by the network deception system 1300, thenetwork deception system 1300 may immediately initiate ahigh-interaction deception 1336 to respond.

FIG. 13C illustrates an example of escalation from a low-interactiondeception 1328 to a high-interaction deception 1336. As discussed above,the low-interaction deception 1328 may receive a questionable connectionattempt, directed at a MAC and IP address combination 1346 assigned toit. In many cases, the network deception system 1300 will avoid lettinga connection with the low-interaction deception 1328 to complete.

Instead, the network deception system 1300 can initiate ahigh-interaction deception 1336, and redirect the connection to thehigh-interaction deception 1336. Initiating the high-interactiondeception 1336 can include de-assigning the MAC and IP addresscombination 1346 being targeted by the connection attempt, andreassigning the MAC and IP address combination 1346 to thehigh-interaction deception 1336. For example, the MAC address may beassigned to a network interface card (which may be virtual) used by thehigh-interaction deception 1336. The address table 1330 can be updatedto reflect this change. As noted above, the high-interaction deception1336 may be on standby, and can be woken upon initiation. Alternatively,the high-interaction deception 1336 can be booted as an initiation step.In some implementations, initiating the high-interaction deception 1336can also include booting and configuring an operating system.Configuring the operating system can include applying variouscustomizations (e.g., patches and packages) that potentially make oneinstallation of the operating system distinct from another installation.Initiating the high-interaction deception 1336 can also include startingvarious services and making ports available. In various implementations,the network deception system 1300 escalates from the low-interactiondeception 1328 to the high-interaction deception 1336 automatically andwithout human assistance.

The operating system used by the high-interaction deception 1336 can beat least the same base version as the operating system used by thelow-interaction deception 1328. In this way, a threat source may bedeceived into believing that he has been interacting with only onesystem. Similarly, the high-interaction deception 1336 can have the sameservices that are running on the low-interaction deception 1328. Thehigh-interaction deception 1336 can further have information and datathat is only accessible once the possible attacker has established aconnection to the high-interaction deception 1336. As discussed furtherbelow, this information and data can be selected to make thehigh-interaction deception 1336 appear particularly attractive forhacking into.

In most cases the high-interaction deception 1336 is intended toconvincingly emulate just one network device, and so will only beassigned one MAC and IP address combination 1346 at a time.

Keeping a threat source engaged with the high-interaction deception 1336may keep the threat source out of the site network. Additionally, once athreat source is engaged with the high-interaction deception 1336, hisactivity can be closely monitored in order to learn his methods,motivation, and possibly also his identity. The high-interactiondeception 1336 can be configured to log all of the threat source'sactivity, including files downloaded from or uploaded to the Internet,processes initiated on the high-interaction deception 1336, filemodifications made to the high-interaction deception 1336, and so on.Any lateral movement by the threat source—that is, the threat sourceattempting to access another network device—can also be closelymonitored. Should the threat source attempt to access another system,the network deception system can respond by initiating anotherinteractive deception to receive and respond to the access attempt. Insome implementations, the network deception system can initiate anotherhigh-interaction deception. In some cases this new high-interactiondeception can be configured with the MAC and IP addresses of a realnetwork device in the site network. In this way, the threat source maybe fooled into believing that he is accessing legitimate systems whilehe is, in fact, contained within an emulated network.

A noted above, the low-interaction deception 1328 can receive a largeamount of network traffic, and not all the network traffic isquestionable. As also discussed above, the network deception system 1300can intelligently examine the network traffic received by thelow-interaction deception 1328, and determine whether some particularnetwork traffic is questionable.

FIG. 14 illustrates several examples of information about networktraffic that can be used to identify particular network traffic asquestionable. This example is illustrated using TCP handshake messages(SYN, SYN-ACK, and ACK), which can be used to establish a TCP socket.TCP handshake messages are one example of network traffic that can bereceived by a network deception system 1400. Other network protocols cansimilarly use sequences of messages to connect to a network device,transmit data to a network device, and/or obtain data from a networkdevice.

Establishing a connection may be the first step in a conversationbetween a sending 1444 system and a receiving system. To establish aconnection using TCP, the sender 1444 can first send a SYN message. Thereceiving system, here a network deception system 1400, can respond witha SYN-ACK message, which lets the sender 1444 know that the receiverreceived the SYN message. The sender 1444 can subsequently send an ACKmessage, which lets the receiver know that the sender received theSYN-ACK message. Once the receiver receives the ACK message, aconnection is established between the sender 1444 and the receiver.

Not every handshake, however, may be an intention to start aconversation. For example, a port scanning tool or a ping process inmost cases is not likely to send additional messages after the handshakecompletes. The network deception system 1400 in most cases avoidsinitiating a high-interaction deception for connection attempts that maynot result in an actual conversation. The network deception system 1400may, instead, save processing resources for apparent attacks.

To identify possible attacks, the network deception system 1400 canexamine, for example, the behavior of incoming network traffic orhistorical data that captured the flow of data from a particular sender1444, and attempt to identify network traffic that may be associatedwith an attack. For example, handshakes initiated by tools and automatedprocesses such as port scans and ping tend to occur very rapidly. Thatis, there may be a minimal or predictable delay between transmission ofthe SYN, SYN-ACK, and ACK messages. For example, in the illustratedexample, three handshakes from source IP address 65.68.1.205 occurred inrapid succession, with a minimal delay between the SYN-ACK and ACKresponse. In this example, it may be that these handshakes wereinitiated by an automated source.

An unexpected delay between the handshake messages may indicate that thehandshake from a particular sender 1444 is suspicious. For example, inthe illustrated example, there was a delay between the SYN-ACK and ACKin the exchange with source IP address 102.10.5.1200. In this example, athreat source at IP address 102.10.5.1200 may be expecting a particularresponse pattern, or may be manually entering commands, and is notlikely to be able to issue the handshake messages with the regularity orpredictability of a tool. Thus a change in a pattern of the handshakemessages may indicate that a particular handshake should be redirectedto a high-interaction deception.

Other clues about the nature of a sender 1444 may be provided by thesender's network address. For example, when a series of handshakemessages are received for sequential target addresses and the handshakemessages originate from the same IP address (e.g., source IP address65.68.1.205 in the illustrated example), it is possible that themessages were generated by a port scanner. As another example, handshakemessages coming from the same source IP address, addressed to the samedestination IP address, may be coming from a ping process.

Once the network deception system 1400 has identified a particularhandshake that is questionable, the network deception system 1400 canredirect the connection attempt to a high-interaction deception. Themanner in which the network deception system 1400 redirects theconnection attempt may depend on the nature of the connection.

FIGS. 15A-15B illustrate examples of deception escalation when a sender1544 makes various types of connection attempts. As discussed above,deception escalation means to redirect the sender's communications to ahigher level deception mechanism. This redirection is configured tooccur seamlessly, so that the sender 1544 may not be aware that it hascommunicated with different deceptions. Redirection occurs when anetwork deception system determines that the sender 1544 is a possiblethreat to the network, and should be kept engaged. When the sender 1544does not appear to be a threat, its connection attempts can be ignored.

The manner in which communications from the sender 1544 are analyzed andredirected can depend on whether the sender 1544 is attempting astateful or a stateless connection. A stateful connection occurs whenthe sender 1544 makes a connection that lasts for the duration of anetwork conversation. Such a connection can also be referred to as apersistent connection. Examples of persistent connections include thoseused for server message block (SMB) data exchanges, remote desktopconnections, and telnet connections, among others. A statelessconnection occurs when the connection between the sender 1544 and thereceiver lasts only long enough for data to be transferred, usually fromthe receiver, after which the connection is terminated by either thesender 1544 or the receiver. Examples of such non-persistent connectionsinclude those used for Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), among others.

FIG. 15A illustrates an example of deception escalation when the sender1544 attempts a persistent connection. In the illustrated example, thesender 1544 is attempting to establish a TCP connection. In otherexamples, other network protocols can be used to establish a persistentconnection. These other protocol may use a similar exchange of messages.

As discussed above, a sender 1544 can initiate a connection attempt bysending a SYN message to the system with which the sender 1544 wishes toconnect. Here, the receiver system is initially a low-interactiondeception 1528, configured by a network deception system to respond tonetwork traffic directed at one or more MAC and IP addresses. Thelow-interaction deception 1528 can respond to the SYN message with aSYN-ACK. Upon receiving an ACK, the network deception system candetermine that the sender 1544 is attempting to establish a connection.Because the low-interaction deception 1528 is a decoy, and is notintended for any legitimate use of a network, this connection attempt isautomatically suspect.

This suspicion that the sender's connection request is suspect may befurther verified by a receipt of a subsequent data request, or someother communication that assumes the connection is available. While itmay be possible that a legitimate user of the network has accidentallyattempted to connect to the low-interaction deception 1528, the systemmay be configured to assume that this is not the case.

As discussed above, once the network deception system determines thatthe sender 1544 is suspect, the network deception system can redirectcommunications with the sender 1544 to a high-interaction deception1536. The network deception system attempts to execute this redirectionwithout the sender 1544 noticing. In this example, the network deceptionsystem can drop the ACK and subsequent data requests from the sender1544, or otherwise not respond to these messages. To the sender 1544,lack of response to the data request might look to have been caused bynetwork delays and/or packet drops, both of which are not unusual in anetwork. While the network deception system is delaying, it may initiatethe high-interaction deception 1536, if the high-interaction deception1536 is not already available. The network deception system can furtherreassign the MAC and IP address that is the target of the connectionattempt from the low-interaction deception 1528 to the high-interactiondeception 1536.

Stalling by the network deception system can cause the sender 1544 toretry the connection. In some cases, the sender's computing systemhardware or software can automatically retry the connection after acertain delay in receiving responses to data requests. When the sender1544 retries the connection, the high-interaction deception 1536 canrespond and complete the connection. Communications between the sender1544 and the network deception system can thereafter be with thehigh-interaction deception 1536, where the sender's activity can beclosely monitored.

In some implementations, instead of stalling in order to prompt a retryby the sender 1544, the deception system can slow down the rate at whichthe system responds to the sender 1544. Generally, delaying by thenetwork deception system is minimal, so that the sender 1544 remainsengaged with the system. The delay may be just long enough for thehigh-interaction deception 1536 to come up and respond “just in time”(e.g., within a realistic response time) to the connection attempt.

In some implementations, the high-interaction deception 1536 may pick upthe connection with the sender 1544 before the sender 1544 retries hisconnection. Packet drops are not an unusual occurrence in most networks.Thus, when the network deception system drops the first data request,the sender 1544 may automatically retry the data request several timesbefore determining that the connection has dropped. The networkdeception system may drop a few of the data requests, and then have thehigh-interaction deception 1536 accept and respond to one of the retriedrequests, before the sender 1544 retries the connection. Further networktraffic from the sender 1544 may be received by and responded to by thehigh-interaction deception 1536.

FIG. 15B illustrates an example of deception escalation when a messageexchange is for a non-persistent connection. This example uses themessages exchanged when a sender 1544 requests webpage data using theHTTP protocol. HTTP uses TCP as an underlying protocol. In some versionsof the HTTP standard, it is assumed that a TCP connection can beterminated once a webhost has delivered data to a client. Thus thewebhost (here, the network deception system) can disconnect after havingdelivered requested webpage content to a client (here, the sender 1544).HTTP is one example of a network protocol that can use non-persistentconnections. Other network protocols can similarly use non-persistentconnections.

Because HTTP runs on top of TCP, network deception system can receive aSYN message when the sender 1544 initiates a connection for purposes ofretrieving webpage content. The low-interaction deception 1528 can beassigned the MAC and IP address that is being targeted by the sender1544, and thus can respond with SYN-ACK. The sender 1544 cansubsequently send an ACK message, along with an HTTP-GET message, whichincludes the request for webpage content.

The network deception system can determine that the sender 1544 issuspicious, based on the assumption that no legitimate user should beattempting to retrieve web page content from the low-interactiondeception 1528. The network deception system can thus determine toredirect further communication with the sender 1544 to ahigh-interaction deception 1536.

A actual webhost can respond to the HTTP-GET request and can thenterminate the connection. For example, a webhost can respond to theHTTP-GET with a demand for authentication information (e.g., a usernameand password), and then terminate the connection, expecting the sender1544 to respond eventually, or not respond at all.

The network deception system can respond to the HTTP-GET request withAUTH REQUIRED accompanied by FIN to cause the sender 1544 to try theconnection request again. Alternatively, the network deception systemcan respond with a timeout message or other indication that the sender1544 should try his request again. When the sender 1544 retries hisconnection request, the network deception system can have ahigh-interaction deception 1536 respond to the handshake messages, andwith the requested data. From the sender's point of view, it has had arelatively normal interaction with a web server. In actuality, thesender's communications have been redirected to the high-interactiondeception 1536, where the sender's actions can be closely monitored.

For connectionless network protocols, such as UDP, the network deceptionsystem can determine whether to escalate to a high-interaction deceptionbased on what is requested by the connectionless network traffic. Forexample, UDP packets that seek to establish a tunnel may warrantinitiating a high-interaction deception to respond to the tunnelrequest. UDP packets that are merely broadcasting information, however,may not require a response, and thus may not require initiating ahigh-interaction deception.

The examples of FIGS. 13A-13C discussed escalation from a super-lowdeception to a low-interaction deception, and then from alow-interaction deception to a high-interaction deception. In someimplementations, a network deception system can escalate from asuper-low deception directly to a high-interaction deception, withoutfirst escalating to a low-interaction deception.

FIG. 16 illustrates an example of a network deception system 1600escalating an engagement from a super-low deception directly to ahigh-interaction deception 1636. The network deception system 1600 canhave a super-low deception engine 1626, configured to host multiplesuper-low deceptions. Each super-low deception can include at least aMAC address 1632 and an associated IP address 1634, which are stored inan address table 1630. The address table 1630 can also includeassignments 1638, which indicate to which deception a MAC 1632 and IP1634 address pair is currently assigned 1638.

The network deception system 1600 can also have an activelow-interaction deception 1628. The low-interaction deception 1628 maybe emulating one or more network devices, where each network device isrepresented by a MAC 1632 and IP 1634 address pair. The network devicesbeing emulated by the low-interaction deception 1628 may also beidentified by the operating system running on the low-interactiondeception 1628.

The network deception system 1600 can also have a high-interactiondeception 1636 on active standby. The high-interaction deception 1636may be static; that is, the high-interaction deception 1636 can beconfigured with a particular operating system, have a certain set ofservices and ports available, have interesting and valuable-seemingdata, and otherwise look like a system that is available on the sitenetwork. The high-interaction deception 1636 can also includevulnerabilities that make the high-interactive deception 1636 look likean attractive target for an attack.

The super-low deception engine 1626 can respond to basic communications1644 for the MAC 1632 and IP 1634 addresses assigned to the super-lowdeception engine 1626. For example, the super-low deception engine 1626can respond to basic “do you have this IP address” queries, amongothers.

For communications 1644 that are more complex, such as connectionattempts, the network deception system 1600 can initiate thehigh-interaction deception 1636 to respond to these communications 1644.Initiating the high-interaction deception 1636 can include de-assigningthe MAC and IP address combination 1646 from the super-low deceptionengine 1626, and reassigning the MAC and IP addresses combination 1646to the high-interaction deception 1636. The address table 1630 can beupdated to reflect this change. In various implementations, the networkdeception system 1600 can automatically escalate to the high-interactiondeception 1636 without any human aid.

Escalating directly from a super-low deception to a high-interactiondeception can be used in various situations. For example, in someimplementations, a high-interaction deception can be configured as afixed decoy in a site network. Additionally, the high-interactiondeception may be configured as an attractive hacking target. Forexample, the high-interaction deception can be configured with openports and/or data that appear to be valuable. To conserve processingresources, however, the high-interaction deception can be idle orminimally active. The network deception system can bring thehigh-interaction deception out of an idle state only when the networkdeception system receives suspect network traffic that targets the MACand/or IP address assigned to the high-interaction deception.

V. Responsive Deception Mechanisms

In the examples discussed above, the low-interaction andhigh-interaction deception mechanism may have pre-determinedconfigurations. Pre-determined configurations can simplify theconfiguration of a network deception system. In some cases,pre-determined configurations can also enable deceptions mechanisms tobe on standby and/or be to be initiated quickly.

In various implementations, instead of using pre-determinedconfigurations, the low-interaction and high-interaction deceptions canbe configured in response to particular network traffic received by anetwork deception system. By dynamically configuring a deceptionmechanism “just in time” to respond to suspect network traffic, thedeception mechanism can be tailored to the suspect network traffic. Thedeception mechanism may thus be able to present a threat source withsomething the threat source is looking for, and thereby be better ableto engage the threat source.

FIGS. 17A-17C illustrate an example of a deception mechanism 1736 thatcan be configured in response to a particular network packet 1702 orseries of packets. In various implementations, the deception mechanism1736 can be a low-interaction deception or a high-interaction deception.In various implementations, the deception mechanism 1736 can beimplement using computing device, such as a mini-computer, a laptopcomputer, a desktop computer, or a rack-mounted server computer, amongother examples. In various implementations, the deception mechanism 1736can be implemented using a virtual machine. In some implementations, thedeception mechanism 1736 can be part of or executing within a networkemulator.

In various implementations, the deception mechanism 1736 can beconfigured with a number of ports 1732 a-1732 h. In someimplementations, these ports 1732 a-1732 h can be physical networkconnections. In some implementations, the ports 1732 a-1732 h can belogical ports, where a port number can be included in the destinationaddress of a received packet. In these implementations, the deceptionmechanism 1736 can have one or multiple physical network connections. Invarious implementations, each port 1732 a-1732 h is associated with whatis commonly referred to as service, and may also be referred to as aprotocol. For example, port 21 and 22 can be assigned to FTP, port 23can be assigned to the telnet protocol, port 25 can be assigned to theSimple Mail Transfer (SMTP) protocol, and so on. The TCP and UDPstandards presently define 1024 so-called “well-known” ports and 48,128registered ports, some of which are reserved, deprecated, and/or unused.

In the example of FIG. 17A, the deception mechanism 1736 has received apacket 1702 from a possible threat source 1750. It may not be known, atthis point, whether the threat source 1750 is an actual threat, but itcan be assumed since no legitimate source should be sending packets tothe deception mechanism 1736. The received packet 1702 can be a singlepacket, or can be part of a series of packets received packets, or canbe part of an exchange of packets between the deception mechanism 1736and the threat source 1750. The packet 1702 may have been received on aspecific port 1732 c. The received packet 1702 can include a standardheader 1704 and may include a payload 1708.

In various implementations, the deception mechanism 1736 can include aninteraction engine 1720. The interaction engine 1720 can examine thereceived packet 1702 (or series of packets, or exchange of packets, asappropriate) and attempt to identify an intent behind the receivedpacket 1702. To make this determination, the interaction engine 1720 caninclude one or more analysis engines 1740, each of which can beconfigured to do a specific type of analysis. For example, one group ofanalysis engines 1740 can examine the packet header 1704 to determineinformation such as the port number of the port 1732 c over which thepacket 1702 was received, a network protocol used by the received packet1702, a format for the header (e.g., is the packet an Internet Protocolversion 4 (IPv4) or Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) packet, or someother version), and/or the contents of the header 1704, such as a sourceIP address and a destination IP address, among other things. As anotherexample, a group of analysis engines 1740 can example the packet'spayload 1708, and, for example, can determine a format of the dataand/or identify some of the content in the payload 1708.

Using the information, the analysis engines 1740 may be able to identifyan intent behind the received packet 1702. The threat source may betargeting a particular service or data and/or may have particularexpertise in exploiting certain defects. For example, the port numbercan indicate that the threat source 1750 is attempting to establish atelnet, SSH, or remote desktop session with the deception mechanism1736. As another example, the source IP address can indicate whether thethreat source is inside or outside of the site network (that is, thenetwork being defended by the deception mechanism 1736). As anotherexample, the payload format and/or payload contents can indicate thatthe threat source 1750 is attempting to exploit a particularvulnerability, such as a security hole in an operating system,application, and/or protocol. As discussed further below, the deceptionmechanism 1736 can then respond to the determined intent.

The deception mechanism 1736 can, at this stage, also attempt to ensurethat more packets will be received from the threat source. For example,the deception mechanism 1736 can open an appropriate port 1732 c(meaning, enabling the port for receiving packets). As another example,if the threat source 1750 is attempting a connection that requires apassword, the deception mechanism 1736 can be configured to acceptwhatever password the threat source provides, or some password after anumber of login attempts.

In various implementations, the interaction engine 1720 can determine anintent based on a series or sequence of packets, and/or based on anexchange of packets. In various implementations, the interaction engine1720 can re-evaluate its determination of the threat source's intent foreach received packet 1702. In some implementations, the interactionengine 1720 can be assisted by a threat analysis 1760 system that is incommunication with the deception mechanism 1736. In someimplementations, intent determination is conducted by the threatanalysis 1760 system and/or by another system that is in communicationwith the deception mechanism 1736.

FIG. 17B illustrates an example of a configuration of the deceptionmechanism 1736 that resulted from the analysis by the interaction engine1720. In the illustrated example, the deception mechanism 1736 has beenconfigured with a particular software, data 1782 a, and hardwareenvironment. The software environment includes a particular operatingsystem 1770, some services 1772 a-1772 b, an application 1774, and somerunning processes 1776 a. The operating system 1770 has further beenconfigured to include some known operating system vulnerabilities 1778.The deception mechanism 1736 has also been configured with systemvulnerabilities 1784, which can include hardware, firmware, and/or BasicInput/Output System (BIOS) vulnerabilities, among others.

In various implementations, one or more of the components of thedeception mechanism's configuration can have been configured to satisfythe apparent intent of the threat source 1750. For example, the intentmay be to exploit a vulnerability known to exist in a particular versionof a particular operating system type. For example, Linux version 1.1may have a known security hole. In these examples, the deceptionmechanism's operating system 1770 can be configured to match thedetermined operating system type and version. As another example, theintent may be to establish a RDP connection in order to hunt forvaluable data. In this example, one of the two services 1772 a, 1772 bcan be RDP, and a running process 1776 a can be a decoy RDP session. Asanother example, the intent may be to exploit a security flaw in adocument editor or reader, in which the case the application 1774 can bethe flawed document editor or reader. As another example, the intent maybe to exploit a security bug in standard library, such as the OpenSSLcryptography library (a bug known as Heartbleed). In this example, anolder version of the OpenSSL library, which is known to have the bug,can be loaded into the operating system 1770.

The data 1782 a for the deception mechanism 1736 can also be generatedto suit the intent of the threat source 1750. For example, the intentmay be to locate a particular type of file storage system (e.g.,MongoDB, Dropbox, Box, or a system from another vendor), in which casethe data 1782 a can be organized according to the particular filestorage system. Additionally, the data 1782 a can include seeminglyvaluable files. As another example, the intent may be to look foradditional systems to exploit. In this example, the data 1782 a caninclude, for example, email address books (also referred to as contactslists) and decoy log files for telnet, RDP, and/or SSH sessions. In thisexample, the address books can include decoy email addresses, such that,should the threat source 1750 send email to the decoy addresses, theemails can be intercepted and analyzed. In the case of the decoy logfiles, the log files can include decoy IP addresses, and be formatted toappear as if a user conducted sessions with the decoy IP addresses.

In some cases, the intent of the threat source 1750 may not be entirelyclear. In these cases, the deception mechanism 1736 can be configuredwith software and/or data 1782 a that may attract the attention of thethreat source 1750. For example, current threat intelligence mayindicate that hackers have been releasing ransomware that locates andencrypts databases. In this example, the deception mechanism 1736 can beconfigured with such a database. As another example, the securitycommunity may have recently learned of a flaw in a certain application,for which a fix may not yet be available or for which the fix may notyet have been widely distributed. In this example, the deceptionmechanism 1736 can be configured with an un-patched version of theapplication.

In various implementations, the operating system 1770, some of theservices 1772 a-1772 b, the application 1774, the processes 1776 a,and/or the data 1782 a may not be configured to meet the intent of thethreat source 1750 or to attract the attention of the threat source1750. Instead, the software and/or data 1782 a may be configured so thatthe deception mechanism 1736 resembles a fully functional and activelyused system.

In some implementations, the deception mechanism 1736 can also beconfigured to discourage non-threatening sources, such as legitimateusers, from accessing the deception mechanism 1736. For example, shoulda legitimate user connect to the deception mechanism 1736, the user canbe presented with a banner or message the informs the user that she isnot supposed to logged on to this system. The message can include, forexample, dire consequences, such as being reported to management. Theaverage user is likely to disconnect from the deception mechanism 1736upon seeing such a warning.

A threat source, however, is likely to ignore the warning or be enticedby the warning. Alternatively, the threat source may be a program orother automated system that ignores any such messages. Additionally,legitimate users may not notice or be interested in attractive-seemingdecoy data 1782 a, an application 1774 with a security flaw, oroperating system vulnerabilities 1778. Should the threat source 1750make use of the services 1772 a-1772 b or application 1774, engage withthe process 1776 a, and/or access the data 1782 a, this may be furtherevidence that the threat source 1750 is a true threat, and not aninnocent user.

Once the threat source 1750 is engaged, the deception mechanism 1736 canbe configured to keep the threat source 1750 engaged. FIG. 17Cillustrates an example of a reconfiguration of the deception mechanism1736 that can be based on further interactions with the threat source1750. In the illustrated example, it may be that the threat source 1750engaged with a service 1772 a, and based on that interaction, it can bedetermined that the threat source 1750 is seeking to interact withanother service 1772 c. For example, the threat source 1750 may havestarted a telnet session and found a running RDP session among theprocesses 1776 a. In this example, the threat source 1750 may next tryto connect to the running RDP session. The deception mechanism 1736 maythus launch RDP to receive the threat source's RDP connection. Asanother example, the threat source may have initially engaged thedeception mechanism 1736 using the using the Server Message Block (SMB)protocol. SMB can be used to access file directories shared over anetwork. Hence, in this example, the deception mechanism 1736 can beconfigured with additional data 1782 b, configured as a share directory.The additional data 1782 b can further be configured to appear valuable.

In various implementations, in addition to modifying the configurationof the deception mechanism 1736, the network deception system canescalate the deception. For example, the deception mechanism 1736 may bea low-interaction deception, and before continuing the engagement withthe threat source 1750, the system can initiate a high-interactiondeception to take over the engagement. In this example, theconfiguration of the deception mechanism 1736 can be ported to thehigh-interaction deception, so that the high-interaction deception hasthe same operating system 1770, services 1772 a-1772 b, application1774, processes 1776 a, and data 1782 a that the threat source 1750 mayhave previously seen while engaged with the low-interaction deception.

In some cases, keeping the threat source 1750 can require othermeasures. FIG. 17D illustrates one such other measure. In some cases,the threat source 1750 may be looking for other systems to exploit. Forexample, the threat source 1750 may be malware, which is attempting toplace itself on every network system that the malware can reach.Alternatively or additionally, the threat source 1750 may not have foundwhat the threat source 1750 was looking for on the deception mechanism1736, and/or the threat source 1750 may have been looking for one thingand has decided to look for something else, and/or the interactionengine 1720 may have incorrectly guessed the threat source's intent.

In these and other examples the threat source 1750 may use data 1782 aobtained from the deception mechanism 1736 to log into another system.In various implementations, the data 1782 a can include decoy IPaddresses, such that the threat source 1750 is encourage to attempt toconnect to one of these decoy IP addresses.

As illustrated in FIG. 17D, the network deception system can determinethat the threat source 1750 is attempting to establish a connection witha decoy IP address. For example, the deception mechanism 1736 maycapture input from a process launched by the threat source, where theinput includes commands used to establish a network connection. Asanother example, the deception mechanism 1736 may capture outboundpackets targeted to the decoy IP address.

In these and other examples, the network deception system can configurea new deception 1728, and assign the new deception 1728 the decoy IPaddress that that the threat source 1750 is attempting the reach. Invarious implementations, the new deception 1728 can be configured usinginformation that the deception mechanism 1736 has determined about thethreat source 1750. In various implementations, the new deception 1728can also be dynamically reconfigured to respond to interactions from thethreat source 1750.

In various implementations, once it is apparent that the threat source1750 has moved one, the deception mechanism 1736 can shut down theservices 1772 a-1772 b, application 1774, and processes 1776 a, toconserve computing resources.

In the above examples, by dynamically configuring and reconfiguring thedeception mechanism 1736 in response to communications from the threatsource 1750, the threat source 1750 can potentially be kept engaged.Keeping the threat source 1750 engaged can have the benefit of keepingthe threat source 1750 away from actual network systems and trulyvaluable data. Additionally, the deception mechanism 1736 can be used togather intelligence about the threat source 1750. For example, it may bepossible to determine the threat source's methods, such as tools thethreat source is using. As another example, the threat source's activitymay reveal a previously unknown software, firmware, and/or hardwarevulnerability. As another example, it may be possible to identify typesof targets that malicious actors are presently after. As anotherexample, it may be possible to trace a threat source and find itsorigin.

Dynamically reconfiguring the deception mechanism 1736 can also have thebenefit of avoiding littering a site network with traps that unwary,legitimate users can fall into. Instead, a trap can be set up if asuspect interaction is detected, and more traps can be set up to engagethe interaction. Legitimate users are more likely to disengage, thusavoiding the need for more traps.

In various implementations, the techniques discussed above forescalating and configuring deceptions in a context-aware manner, torespond to interactions with a threat source, can be extended to includethe network neighborhood of the deceptions that are in actualcommunication with the threat source. For example, while a threat sourceis engaged with a high-interaction deception, based on that engagement,a network deception system can actively reconfigure the network emulatedaround the high-interaction deception. For example, the network can bemade to appear to have certain virtual local area networks (VLANs),certain types of serves (e.g., database servers, web servers, etc.),and/or certain network services (e.g., virtual private networks (VPNs),network sharing, etc.). In this and other examples, the apparent networkcan be emulated and/or can use low-interaction and/or high-interactiondeceptions to represent various network resources.

Specific details were given in the preceding description to provide athorough understanding of various implementations of systems andcomponents for network threat engagement and deception escalation. Itwill be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, however, thatthe implementations described above may be practiced without thesespecific details. For example, circuits, systems, networks, processes,and other components may be shown as components in block diagram form inorder not to obscure the embodiments in unnecessary detail. In otherinstances, well-known circuits, processes, algorithms, structures, andtechniques may be shown without unnecessary detail in order to avoidobscuring the embodiments.

It is also noted that individual implementations may be described as aprocess which is depicted as a flowchart, a flow diagram, a data flowdiagram, a structure diagram, or a block diagram. Although a flowchartmay describe the operations as a sequential process, many of theoperations can be performed in parallel or concurrently. In addition,the order of the operations may be re-arranged. A process is terminatedwhen its operations are completed, but could have additional steps notincluded in a figure. A process may correspond to a method, a function,a procedure, a subroutine, a subprogram, etc. When a process correspondsto a function, its termination can correspond to a return of thefunction to the calling function or the main function.

The term “computer-readable medium” includes, but is not limited to,portable or non-portable storage devices, optical storage devices, andvarious other mediums capable of storing, containing, or carryinginstruction(s) and/or data. A computer-readable medium may include anon-transitory medium in which data can be stored and that does notinclude carrier waves and/or transitory electronic signals propagatingwirelessly or over wired connections. Examples of a non-transitorymedium may include, but are not limited to, a magnetic disk or tape,optical storage media such as compact disk (CD) or digital versatiledisk (DVD), flash memory, memory or memory devices. A computer-readablemedium may have stored thereon code and/or machine-executableinstructions that may represent a procedure, a function, a subprogram, aprogram, a routine, a subroutine, a module, a software package, a class,or any combination of instructions, data structures, or programstatements. A code segment may be coupled to another code segment or ahardware circuit by passing and/or receiving information, data,arguments, parameters, or memory contents. Information, arguments,parameters, data, etc. may be passed, forwarded, or transmitted via anysuitable means including memory sharing, message passing, token passing,network transmission, or the like.

The various examples discussed above may further be implemented byhardware, software, firmware, middleware, microcode, hardwaredescription languages, or any combination thereof. When implemented insoftware, firmware, middleware or microcode, the program code or codesegments to perform the necessary tasks (e.g., a computer-programproduct) may be stored in a computer-readable or machine-readablemedium. A processor(s), implemented in an integrated circuit, mayperform the necessary tasks.

Where components are described as being “configured to” perform certainoperations, such configuration can be accomplished, for example, bydesigning electronic circuits or other hardware to perform theoperation, by programming programmable electronic circuits (e.g.,microprocessors, or other suitable electronic circuits) to perform theoperation, or any combination thereof.

The various illustrative logical blocks, modules, circuits, andalgorithm steps described in connection with the implementationsdisclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computersoftware, firmware, or combinations thereof. To clearly illustrate thisinterchangeability of hardware and software, various illustrativecomponents, blocks, modules, circuits, and steps have been describedabove generally in terms of their functionality. Whether suchfunctionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon theparticular application and design constraints imposed on the overallsystem. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality invarying ways for each particular application, but such implementationdecisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from thescope of the present disclosure.

The techniques described herein may also be implemented in electronichardware, computer software, firmware, or any combination thereof. Suchtechniques may be implemented in any of a variety of devices such asgeneral purposes computers, wireless communication device handsets, orintegrated circuit devices having multiple uses including application inwireless communication device handsets and other devices. Any featuresdescribed as modules or components may be implemented together in anintegrated logic device or separately as discrete but interoperablelogic devices. If implemented in software, the techniques may berealized at least in part by a computer-readable data storage mediumcomprising program code including instructions that, when executed,performs one or more of the methods described above. Thecomputer-readable data storage medium may form part of a computerprogram product, which may include packaging materials. Thecomputer-readable medium may comprise memory or data storage media, suchas random access memory (RAM) such as synchronous dynamic random accessmemory (SDRAM), read-only memory (ROM), non-volatile random accessmemory (NVRAM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory(EEPROM), FLASH memory, magnetic or optical data storage media, and thelike. The techniques additionally, or alternatively, may be realized atleast in part by a computer-readable communication medium that carriesor communicates program code in the form of instructions or datastructures and that can be accessed, read, and/or executed by acomputer, such as propagated signals or waves.

The program code may be executed by a processor, which may include oneor more processors, such as one or more digital signal processors(DSPs), general purpose microprocessors, an application specificintegrated circuits (ASICs), field programmable logic arrays (FPGAs), orother equivalent integrated or discrete logic circuitry. Such aprocessor may be configured to perform any of the techniques describedin this disclosure. A general purpose processor may be a microprocessor;but in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor,controller, microcontroller, or state machine. A processor may also beimplemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combinationof a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one ormore microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other suchconfiguration. Accordingly, the term “processor,” as used herein mayrefer to any of the foregoing structure, any combination of theforegoing structure, or any other structure or apparatus suitable forimplementation of the techniques described herein. In addition, in someaspects, the functionality described herein may be provided withindedicated software modules or hardware modules configured for networkthreat engagement and deception escalation.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method, comprising: configuring, by a networkdevice on a network, a super-low deception mechanism, wherein thesuper-low deception mechanism includes address information, and whereinthe address information includes a Media Access Control (MAC) addressand an Internet Protocol (IP) address; receiving network trafficaddressed to the MAC address or the IP address; determining that thenetwork traffic is suspect; and initiating an interactive deceptionmechanism, wherein initiating the interactive deception mechanismincludes de-assigning the address information from the address deceptionmechanism and reassigning the address information to the interactivedeception mechanism; and directing the network traffic to theinteractive deception mechanism.
 2. The method of claim 1, furthercomprising: receiving a request addressed to the address deceptionmechanism; and responding to the request using the address information.3. The method of claim 1, wherein determining that network traffic issuspect includes: analyzing a behavior of the network traffic; anddetermining that a behavior of particular network traffic corresponds tobehavior associated with a network attack.
 4. The method of claim 1,wherein the interactive deception mechanism is a low-interactiondeception mechanism, wherein a low-interaction deception mechanism isconfigured to respond to one or more network addresses.
 5. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the interactive deception mechanism is alow-interaction deception mechanism, and further comprising: monitoringthe network traffic to the low-interaction deception mechanism; anddetermining that particular network traffic is suspect.
 6. The method ofclaim 5, further comprising: initiating a high-interaction deceptionmechanism, wherein initiating includes de-assigning the addressinformation from the low-interaction deception mechanism and reassigningthe address information to the high-interaction deception mechanism; anddirecting the particular network traffic to the high-interactiondeception mechanism.
 7. The method of claim 1, wherein the interactivedeception mechanism is a high-interaction deception mechanism, wherein ahigh-interaction deception mechanism is configured with a particularoperating system and particular services.
 8. The method of claim 1,wherein the interactive deception mechanism is executing on the networkdevice.
 9. The method of claim 1, wherein the interactive deceptionmechanism is executing on another network device.
 10. A network device,comprising: one or more processors; and a non-transitorycomputer-readable medium including instructions that, when executed bythe one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to performoperations including: configuring an address deception mechanism,wherein the address deception mechanism includes address information,and wherein the address information includes a Media Access Control(MAC) address and an Internet Protocol (IP) address; receiving networktraffic addressed to the MAC address or the IP address; determining thatthe network traffic is suspect; and initiating an interactive deceptionmechanism, wherein initiating the interactive deception mechanismincludes de-assigning the address information from the address deceptionmechanism and reassigning the address information to the interactivedeception mechanism; and directing the network traffic to theinteractive deception mechanism.
 11. The network device of claim 10,wherein the non-transitory computer-readable medium further includesinstructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, causethe one or more processors to perform operations including: receivingrequests addressed to the address deception mechanism; and responding tothe requests using the address information.
 12. The network device ofclaim 10, wherein the instructions that cause the one or more processorsto determine that network traffic is suspect include instructions that,when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or moreprocessors to perform operations including: analyzing a behavior of thenetwork traffic; and determining that a behavior of particular networktraffic corresponds to behavior associated with a network attack. 13.The network device of claim 10, wherein the interactive deceptionmechanism is a low-interaction deception mechanism, wherein thelow-interaction deception mechanism is configured to respond to one ormore network addresses.
 14. The network device of claim 10, wherein theinteractive deception mechanism is a low-interaction deceptionmechanism, and wherein the non-transitory computer-readable mediumfurther includes instructions that, when executed by the one or moreprocessors, cause the one or more processors to perform operationsincluding: monitoring the network traffic to the low-interactiondeception mechanism; and determining that particular network traffic issuspect.
 15. The network device of claim 14, wherein the non-transitorycomputer-readable medium further includes instructions that, whenexecuted by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processorsto perform operations including: initiating a high-interaction deceptionmechanism, wherein initiating includes de-assigning the addressinformation from the low-interaction deception mechanism and reassigningthe address information to the high-interaction deception mechanism; anddirecting the particular network traffic to the high-interactiondeception mechanism.
 16. The network device of claim 10, wherein theinteractive deception mechanism is a high-interaction deceptionmechanism, wherein the high-interaction deception mechanism isconfigured with a particular operating system and particular services.17. The network device of claim 10, wherein the interactive deceptionmechanism is executing on the network device.
 18. The network device ofclaim 10, wherein the interactive deception mechanism is executing onanother network device.
 19. A computer-program product tangibly embodiedin a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium, includinginstructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause theone or more processors to: configure an address deception mechanism,wherein the address deception mechanism includes address information,and wherein the address information includes a Media Access Control(MAC) address and an Internet Protocol (IP) address; receive networktraffic addressed to the MAC address or the IP address; determine thatthe network traffic is suspect; and initiate an interactive deceptionmechanism, wherein initiating the interactive deception mechanismincludes de-assigning the address information from the address deceptionmechanism and reassigning the address information to the interactivedeception mechanism; and direct the network traffic to the interactivedeception mechanism.
 20. The computer-program product of claim 19,further including instructions that, when executed by one or moreprocessors, cause the one or more processors to: receive requestsaddressed to the address deception mechanism; and respond to therequests using the address information.